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Abstract
A concept of immunity for foreign heads of state has existed since ancient times. Such immu-
nity constitutes customary international law (“CIL”) and, when applicable, frees such individuals
from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign nations while carrying out their duties. In the United
States, executive branch guidance is considered determinative on the issue of foreign head-of-state
immunity; however, the executive branch does not always provide suggestions of immunity, or it
may provide suggestions that violate CIL. Drawing upon both US and against foreign sitting and
former heads of state and government officials increasingly are becoming more established and
ma provide additional guidance in the absence of, or as a supplement to, US executive branch
guidance. For example, while relevant international immunity law norms generally prohibit crim-
inal prosecutions by domestic jurisdictions against foreign sitting heads of state and other senior
governmental officials, they allow such suits against former leaders and officials in certain circum-
stances. Moreover, these same norms permit prosecutions against both sitting and former heads
of state and officials if these prosecutions are commenced by international criminal tribunals (e.g.,
the ongoing International Criminal Court proceeding against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan).
Significantly, the recent US Supreme Court case United States v. Samantar significantly changed
the related doctrine of foreign official immunity in the United States. Samantar essentially re-
moved statutory analysis of foreign official immunity through the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act (“FSIA”) and ostensibly replaced it with traditional common law analysis. In light of this
radical shift in the foreign official immunity inquiry, this Article suggests an analytical approach
that US courts may draw upon in the aftermath of Samantar. Such an approach, reflecting a “to-
tality of circumstances” analysis, combines certain aspects of the existing common law analysis
from the head-of-state context with particular approaches used by courts in the official immunity
context under the FSIA. Finally, in light of both the evolving principle of subsidiarity, which an
increasing number of non-US jurisdictions follow, and the concept of complementarity adopted
by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), this Article attempts to shed light on how US courts
should approach the issue of whether to defer to either the courts of other nations (i.e., subsidiarity)
or to international tribunals (i.e., complementarity) in those specific cases in which these courts
or tribunals are actively proceeding against a head of state or other foreign official who is also
a defendant in a US court. For example, potentially strong policy reasons related to the mainte-
nance of peaceful foreign relations among nations, and equally potent conceptual reasons related
to the sovereignty of individual states, appear to support US courts’ deferring to ongoing or pend-
ing non-US, national trials of heads of state and certain foreign government officials, particularly
when these trials have a clear connection to the foreign country and are legitimate. Similarly,
deference to an international criminal tribunal may be appropriate in certain circumstances. This
Article consists of four parts. Part I addresses the US approach to immunity for current and former
foreign heads of state as well as the related issue of foreign official immunity. Part I includes
a discussion of the 2010 US Supreme Court case of Samantar, which addresses foreign official
immunity. Part II explores head-of-state and official immunity under international law, includ-
ing a discussion of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium decided by the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the Charles Taylor immunity decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the ongoing case by the ICC against Sudanese President Al-Bashir, and relevant interna-
tional codification on the issue. Part III examines third-party prosecutions of heads of state and
other government officials by other national jurisdictions. This part discusses the jurisdictions of
Germany, Great Britain, and Spain and how they approach immunity from prosecution for foreign
heads of state and officials. Part IV includes an analysis of how US courts should continue to han-
dle the evolving issues of foreign head-of-state and foreign official immunity, particularly in light
of Samantar and recent international developments, including high-profile proceedings involving
heads of state and other governmental officials by the ICC, ICJ, and other international tribunals,
and increased activity by foreign national courts against these individuals.
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INTRODUCTION 
A concept of immunity for foreign heads of state has existed 
since ancient times.1 Such immunity constitutes customary 
international law (“CIL”) and, when applicable, frees such 
individuals from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign nations while 
carrying out their duties.2 In the United States, executive branch 
guidance is considered determinative on the issue of foreign 
head-of-state immunity; however, the executive branch does not 
always provide suggestions of immunity, or it may provide 
suggestions that violate CIL.3 Drawing upon both US and 
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1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES ch. 6, intro. note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
2. See id. at chs. 5–6, intro. notes. Such protections exist in order to foster positive 
relations between nations. See id. at ch. 6, intro. note. The guarantee of freedom from 
prosecution allows for states to exchange representatives without fear of persecution. 
Daniel Singerman, Comment, It’s Still Good to Be the King: An Argument for Maintaining the 
Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 413, 418 (2007). 
Furthermore, the prohibition on allowing states to prosecute certain officials and 
representatives from foreign nations promotes respect for national sovereignty by 
disallowing one state from passing judgment on the actions of another. See id. The 
system, or framework, of immunity works on a basis of reciprocity; one nation must treat 
another’s representative on equal footing. See id. 
3. For the idea that executive branch guidance is determinative on the issue of 
sitting-head-of-state immunity analysis, see infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text 
(citing and discussing relevant case law). For the role of executive branch guidance for 
former head-of-state immunity, see infra note 67 and accompanying text (citing and 
discussing relevant case law). For a discussion of the independent court analysis in cases 
in which executive branch guidance is not forthcoming, see infra notes 49–56, 60 and 
accompanying text (citing and discussing relevant case law). For a thorough discussion 
of the nebulous nature of the head-of-state immunity inquiry in the United States, 
including the problems associated with executive branch (e.g., State Department) 
guidance on the head-of-state immunity issue (e.g., arbitrariness, inconsistency, 
unfairness, and undue political influence) and the overall dearth of judicial cases, see 
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international law, this Article endeavors to establish an analytical 
framework for US courts to use when such suggestions of 
immunity are not provided.4 In particular, certain contextual 
factors such as waiver by the foreign nation and the nature of the 
conduct of the foreign head of state may be considered.5 In 
addition, international law norms governing domestic suits 
 
Jerrold Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of 
Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 183–88, 197 (1986). In light of the uncertain nature of 
the head-of-state inquiry, Mallory proposes that legislation should be passed by the US 
Congress on the head-of-state immunity issue that is similar to existing legislation on 
immunity for foreign states (e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)). See 
id. at 187–92, 197. Since the time of the often-cited Mallory article, customary 
international law has become more developed in the area of head-of-state immunity (in 
particular, with respect to foreign national prosecutions), and international criminal 
tribunals have been created to prosecute leading government officials, including heads 
of state, for grave crimes. This Article will address the impact of these developments up 
to the present time on the issue of head-of-state immunity. There are only a few articles 
that have addressed the issue of head-of-state immunity in the US in light of the recent 
burst of international activity in this area, but few, if any, have seriously attempted to 
synthesize and harmonize US domestic law in this area with both international norms 
and the law of an increasing number of foreign jurisdictions. This Article seeks to do this 
while also addressing the related doctrine of official immunity in light of the landmark 
2010 US Supreme Court case of United States v. Samantar. For articles that have 
examined the issue of head-of-state immunity in light of international law developments 
in this area, see Kaitlin R. O’Donnell, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of 
Congo v. France) and Head of State Immunity: How Impenetrable Should The Immunity Veil 
Remain?, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 375, 379 (2008) (noting that a recent decision of the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) declining to issue provisional measures to stop 
France from investigating alleged international crimes in the Congo by its senior 
leaders, including the Congolese head of state, signals a positive change from 
“upholding a head of state’s immunity because the executive is one and the same as the 
state, to promoting governmental transparency, remedies for human rights violations, 
and individual accountability”); Singerman, supra note 2 (arguing for maintaining the 
current US and international systems for head-of-state immunity); and Brent Wible, “De–
Jeopardizing Justice”: Domestic Prosecutions for International Crimes and the Need for 
Transnational Convergence, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 285–90, 293–95 (2002) 
(reviewing international developments in head-of-state immunity and arguing in general 
that certain steps must be taken to harmonize national prosecutions of international 
crimes). For a further discussion of Republic of Congo v. France in the ICJ case, see infra 
note 98. 
4. Under the traditional Restatement approach, immunity conferred to sitting 
heads of state and certain high officials, such as a minister for foreign affairs, is 
considered absolute as it stems from the sovereignty of the state. See RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 1, at. ch. 5, intro. note (1987). Nonetheless, modern US courts have 
considered executive branch guidance determinative on the issue of immunity. See infra 
notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
5. For a further discussion of these contextual factors, see infra notes 179–183 and 
accompanying text (head-of-state analysis) and infra notes 192–195 (former-head-of-state 
analysis). 
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against foreign sitting and former heads of state and government 
officials increasingly are becoming more established and may 
provide additional guidance in the absence of, or as a 
supplement to, US executive branch guidance. For example, 
while relevant international immunity law norms generally 
prohibit criminal prosecutions by domestic jurisdictions against 
foreign sitting heads of state and other senior governmental 
officials, they allow such suits against former leaders and officials 
in certain circumstances.6 Moreover, these same norms permit 
prosecutions against both sitting and former heads of state and 
officials if these prosecutions are commenced by international 
criminal tribunals (e.g., the ongoing International Criminal 
Court proceeding against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan).7 
Significantly, the recent US Supreme Court case United States 
v. Samantar significantly changed the related doctrine of foreign 
official immunity in the United States. Samantar essentially 
removed statutory analysis of foreign official immunity through 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (“FSIA”) and ostensibly 
replaced it with traditional common law analysis.8 In light of this 
radical shift in the foreign official immunity inquiry, this Article 
suggests an analytical approach that US courts may draw upon in 
the aftermath of Samantar. Such an approach, reflecting a 
“totality of circumstances” analysis, combines certain aspects of 
the existing common law analysis from the head-of-state context 
 
6. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶ 47 (May 31, 2003); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). According to the ICJ in Congo v. 
Belgium,  
a court of one State may try a former [senior official or head of state] of 
another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her 
period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of 
office in a private capacity. 
Id. ¶ 61. 
7. For example, the statutes of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all decline to 
recognize immunity from prosecution for grave crimes committed by heads of state and 
other governmental officials. See infra note 184. For further discussion of the ICC 
proceeding against the President of Sudan, as well as proceedings by other international 
tribunals against heads of state, see infra note 117. 
8. See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). For a further discussion 
of Samantar, see infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
  
2011] HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY AFTER SAMANTAR 335 
with particular approaches used by courts in the official 
immunity context under the FSIA.9 
Finally, in light of both the evolving principle of subsidiarity, 
which an increasing number of non-US jurisdictions follow, and 
the concept of complementarity adopted by the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), this Article attempts to shed light on 
how US courts should approach the issue of whether to defer to 
either the courts of other nations (i.e., subsidiarity) or to 
international tribunals (i.e., complementarity) in those specific 
cases in which these courts or tribunals are actively proceeding 
against a head of state or other foreign official who is also a 
defendant in a US court.10 For example, potentially strong policy 
reasons related to the maintenance of peaceful foreign relations 
among nations, and equally potent conceptual reasons related to 
the sovereignty of individual states, appear to support US courts’ 
deferring to ongoing or pending non-US, national trials of heads 
of state and certain foreign government officials, particularly 
when these trials have a clear connection to the foreign country 
and are legitimate. Similarly, deference to an international 
criminal tribunal may be appropriate in certain circumstances. 
This Article consists of four parts. Part I addresses the US 
approach to immunity for current and former foreign heads of 
state as well as the related issue of foreign official immunity. Part 
I includes a discussion of the 2010 US Supreme Court case of 
Samantar, which addresses foreign official immunity. Part II 
explores head-of-state and official immunity under international 
law, including a discussion of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium decided by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the 
Charles Taylor immunity decision of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, the ongoing case by the ICC against Sudanese President 
Al-Bashir, and relevant international codification on the issue. 
Part III examines third-party prosecutions of heads of state and 
other government officials by other national jurisdictions.11 This 
 
9. For a detailed description of this totality of circumstances approach to official 
immunity analysis, see infra pp. 146–47. 
10. For further discussion of subsidiarity, see infra Part III.B (discussing the cases of 
Spain and Germany). For a further discussion of the issue of complementarity within the 
ICC, see infra notes 184–189 and accompanying text. 
11. Third-party prosecution in this context is intended to mean a prosecution by a 
jurisdiction for a crime that occurred in another state, and neither the accused nor the 
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part discusses the jurisdictions of Germany, Great Britain, and 
Spain and how they approach immunity from prosecution for 
foreign heads of state and officials. Part IV includes an analysis of 
how US courts should continue to handle the evolving issues of 
foreign head-of-state and foreign official immunity, particularly 
in light of Samantar and recent international developments, 
including high-profile proceedings involving heads of state and 
other governmental officials by the ICC, ICJ, and other 
international tribunals, and increased activity by foreign national 
courts against these individuals. 
I. HEAD-OF-STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY: US 
APPROACH 
A. Origins 
In the United States, the concept of head-of-state immunity 
and foreign sovereign immunity for states can be traced to the 
1812 US Supreme Court case of The Schooner Exchange.12 In fact, 
though the Court’s direct holding in The Schooner Exchange dealt 
with the immunity of a foreign ship physically located in the US 
port of Philadelphia, the case’s greater significance is its 
establishment of the doctrine of absolute immunity of foreign 
sovereigns.13 In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall 
stated that, while states generally enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over 
their territory (as an attribute of their sovereignty), states have 
conceded, or “waived,” a part of this jurisdiction in order to 
conduct foreign relations. One “part” of this absolute 
jurisdiction that has been waived, according to Marshall, is “the 
exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or 
detention within a foreign territory.”14 
Though the head-of-state immunity concept first arose in US 
jurisprudence in The Schooner Exchange, very few cases implicating 
 
victim is a citizen or national of the prosecuting jurisdiction. Such a prosecution 
generally proceeds under the theory of universal jurisdiction. 
12. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
13. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) 
(“Although the narrow holding of The Schooner Exchange was only that the courts of the 
United States lack jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign state found in [a US] 
port, that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to 
foreign sovereigns.”). 
14. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137. 
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the concept appeared in the United States prior to the late 
twentieth century.15 In fact, the concept became subsumed, for 
the most part, within the broader principle of “absolute foreign 
sovereign immunity for states.”16 Since the late twentieth century, 
however, head-of-state immunity has emerged in the United 
States as its own distinct concept.17 In Tachiona v. Mugabe, Judge 
Marrero articulated several reasons why the number of litigated 
cases against heads of state for issues related to their unofficial, 
private conduct may have increased in the US in the late 
twentieth century.18 These reasons include, according to 
Marrerro, the undertaking by heads of state of more personal 
business opportunities in the expanded international trade 
market and the accompanying greater exposure to lawsuits such 
opportunities may bring.19 In addition, with the recent increase 
in the body of substantive international criminal law norms, 
 
15. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 275 & n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d 
on other grounds, Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In this 
precedential void, . . . [US] courts, on the few occasions in which the principle of 
sovereign immunity was asserted [prior to 1976] in connection with an action filed 
against a head-of-state, regarded the conceptual issue as subsumed within the 
recognized principle of absolute sovereign immunity for states and governed by The 
Schooner Exchange doctrine. This treatment suggested the existence of a unified theory of 
sovereign immunity integrating the traditional notion that the sovereign and its ruler 
were one and the same, concepts that had not yet branched into distinct doctrines 
subject to their own separate policies, standards and applications.” (citing Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—Suggestion by the 
Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 529 (1994); Shoba Varughese George, Head of 
State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still Confused after All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1051, 1055 (1995))). 
16. Id. at 275–76 (“[A]ny reference to a head-of-state immunity ‘doctrine’ as a 
concept distinct from foreign state immunity is a construct that does not arise in the case 
law and commentary as a specifically identified and widely recognized legal principle 
until after 1976.” (citing Dellapenna, supra note 15, at 529–30)). Note, however, that if a 
plaintiff attempts to mask a suit against a state by suing its head, US courts still generally 
treat the suit as one against the state: “Ordinarily, a proceeding against a head of state or 
government that is in essence a suit against the state is treated like a claim against the 
state for purposes of immunity.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporters’ Notes ¶ 
14 (1987). 
17. After 1976 and the passage of FSIA, US courts are increasingly treating head-of-
state immunity and foreign sovereign immunity for the state itself as both different and 
unique concepts, each with its own separate issues. See Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d. at 277–
78 & n.68 (describing several cases recognizing head-of-state immunity as a distinct 
concept). 
18. Id. at 278. 
19. See id. (citing First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1112–13 (D.D.C. 
1996); Lasidi, S.A. v. Financiera Avenida, S.A., No. 5864/52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1988), aff’d 538 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1989)). 
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plaintiffs have begun to use the courts to redress violations of 
these norms, including violations by heads of state.20 
Traditionally, under the theory of absolute foreign sovereign 
immunity, states that were sued in US courts made special 
appearances to assert immunity, resulting in dismissal of the 
suit.21 In particular, in the twentieth century, foreign states 
increasingly contacted the US State Department to request that 
the Department of Justice make a “suggestion of immunity” to 
the presiding court.22 As early as 1943, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that a suggestion of immunity from the executive branch 
must be accepted by the courts.23 The suggestion was found to be 
a conclusive decision, and to proceed would interfere with the 
conduct of foreign relations.24 In 1945, the Court reasserted that 
it is not the courts’ place to make decisions to deny or grant 
immunity, but rather this authority lies within the executive 
branch.25 This deference to the executive branch has continued 
to this day in the particular context of head-of-state immunity26 
(but, notably, not foreign sovereign immunity).27 
 
20. Id. at 278–81 (citing Dellapenna, supra note 15, at 529–31; George, supra note 
15 at 1051–52, 1054). Another reason identified by Judge Marrero in Tachiona dealt with 
the passage of FSIA in 1976, which is discussed infra notes 29–47 and accompanying 
text. Judge Marrero said: 
[S]ome plaintiffs, aware that suits naming the state directly are explicitly 
barred by the FSIA, either for tactical effect or to test the substantive contours 
of the Act’s exceptions, have sought to assert theories of liability that extend to 
foreign officials not only as “agencies or instrumentalities” of the state, but in 
their personal capacities. 
Id. at 278 (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Dellapenna, supra note 15 at 530). 
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at ch. 5, intro. note (1987). 
22. Id. 
23. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); see also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 1, at ch. 5, intro. note (1987). 
24. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589. 
25. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945); see also Ye v. 
Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at ch. 5 intro. 
note (1987). 
26. See Ye, 383 F.3d at 625–26 (“The Supreme Court has held, however, that the 
Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity is conclusive and not subject to judicial 
inquiry.” (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589; Compañia Española de Navegacion 
Maritima, S.A. v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617 
(5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961))). 
27. See infra Part I.B. 
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In 1952, the Acting Legal Adviser of the US Department of 
State, Jack B. Tate, wrote to the Acting Attorney General setting 
forth the department’s position on foreign sovereign immunity.28 
The Tate Letter asserted that the department would henceforth 
follow the more limited form of immunity known as the 
restrictive theory.29 This theory essentially recognizes the 
immunity of the sovereign for public acts but not for private, 
commercial acts.30 The practice of immunity decisions by the 
State Department using the restrictive theory, however, soon 
came under criticism, particularly for its inconsistency.31 
B. Head-of-State Immunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, and 
the Common Law 
By the 1970s, both the practicing bar and Department of 
State sought to relieve the department of its role of ruling on 
sovereign immunity claims; a more precise and codified set of 
standards were sought to correct this system.32 After more than a 
decade of debate, the US Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”) to streamline the sovereign 
immunity decision system.33 The FSIA is premised on the 
restrictive theory of immunity, and places US courts in charge of 
the immunity determination once a claim of immunity is raised 
 
28. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to 
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 25 Dep't St. Bull. 984–85 
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 
562–63 (5th ed. 2007). 
29. Tate Letter, supra note 28; see also CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 564–65 (“For 
a few years after the Tate Letter, the State Department usually made decisions on 
sovereign immunity claims by a foreign state on the basis of the foreign government’s 
submission. Criticism of this procedure, however, led the Department’s Office of Legal 
Adviser to conduct quasi-judicial hearings on whether a particular claim of immunity was 
within the Tate Letter’s criteria.”). 
30. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698, 711, 
714 (1976) (citing Tate Letter, supra note 28). 
31. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 566 (“This regime [created in the Tate 
Letter], under which the State Department made some immunity determinations and 
the courts made others, did not always produce consistent decisions.”). 
32. Id. (“Unhappiness with the process for deciding immunity under the Tate 
Letter and a desire for greater predictability led private lawyers, scholars, and the 
Department of State to push for legislation establishing more precise criteria.”) 
33. Id. at 568; see Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (2006). 
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by the foreign state.34 In general, FSIA presumes immunity on 
the part of the foreign state being sued; however, there are 
various exceptions to this immunity.35 These exceptions include 
any explicit or implicit waiver of immunity by the foreign state;36 
a counterclaim to a suit commenced by a foreign state in the 
United States;37 certain commercial activity engaged in by the 
foreign state;38 certain noncommercial torts committed by the 
 
34. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 568 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 7, 12 
(1976)). 
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (“Subject to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act[,] a foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”); see also CARTER ET 
AL., supra note 28, at 568 (“Under this [FSIA] structure, a court must determine 
whether the foreign state defendant is immune from suit in order to determine whether 
the court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction. If the court finds that the 
defendant is immune, the court lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 
Conversely, if the court finds that there is an exception to immunity, and that proper 
service has been made, the court automatically has personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction (assuming no violation of due process requirements).”) For the relevant 
provisions of the various exceptions to immunity, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–07; see also infra 
notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1) (2006) (effective January 28, 2008) (“A foreign state 
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States 
in any case—(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by 
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may 
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver . . . .”). At least one 
judge has argued that a state’s violation of a customary international law norm 
constitutes a waiver. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1185–86 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wald, J., dissenting). The majority trend reflected in US case law, 
however, appears to go against this argument (e.g., that a violation of a jus cogens norm 
by a state should constitute a waiver). See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 586. 
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (“In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a 
foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state 
shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim—(a) for which a 
foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under section 1605 of this chapter had 
such claim been brought in a separate action against the foreign state; or (b) arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign 
state; or (c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in 
amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.”). 
38. See id. § 1605 (a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the 
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that 
act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . .”). 
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foreign state;39 particular types of expropriation actions by 
foreign states;40 and actions attempting to enforce arbitral awards 
or agreements.41 Formerly, there was an additional immunity 
exception under FSIA for terrorist actions by certain foreign 
states; however, this exception has now been repealed.42 
 
39. See id. § 1605(a)(5) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . not otherwise encompassed 
[by the commercial activity exception in § 1605(a)(2)], in which money damages are 
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of 
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of 
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within 
the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to—(A) any 
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any claim 
arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights . . . .”). 
40. See id. § 1605(a)(3) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property 
taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property 
exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property 
or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a 
commercial activity in the United States . . . .”). 
41. See id. § 1605(a)(6) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is 
brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the 
benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen 
or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant 
to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to 
take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a 
treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the 
agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this 
section or section 1607, or [the waiver exception in § 1605(a)(1)] is otherwise 
applicable.”). For the text of § 1607, see supra note 37. 
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. 110–181, 122 Stat. 341, Div. A, § 1083(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“A foreign 
state [that is a designated supporter of terrorism] shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . (7) not 
otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign 
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or 
resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is 
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within 
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.”). For additional explanation of 
the designated state supporter of terrorism requirement and for a list of states that have 
been so designated by the US government, see CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 603. The 
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According to most US courts, FSIA and its exceptions do not 
generally apply to suits against heads of state.43 Rather, using the 
common law approach first introduced in The Schooner Exchange, 
US courts look directly to the executive branch for guidance on 
the issue of head-of-state immunity.44 For example, in Lafontant v. 
 
US Congress has allowed punitive damages to be sought against officials associated with 
states who sponsor terrorism or who engage in the relevant terrorist acts. See id. at 604; 
see also Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub.L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 
3009–172, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c) (“An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism . . . while acting within the scope of his or her 
office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national . . . for personal 
injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of 
the United States may maintain jurisdiction [under 28 U.S.C. Section 1605 (a)(7)] for 
money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, 
and punitive damages . . . .”). Even prior to the Civil Liability Act, state agencies and 
instrumentalities (but not individuals) who were designated sponsors of terrorism could 
be sued for punitive damages. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 604 (referring to 28 
U.S.C. § 1606). 
43. For example, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in United 
States v. Noriega: 
[The] FSIA “contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims 
of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political 
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.” It codified the State Department’s 
general criteria for making suggestions of immunity, and transferred the 
responsibility for case-by-case application of these principles from the 
Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch. Because the FSIA addresses neither head-
of-state immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context, head-of-state 
immunity could attach in cases, such as this one, only pursuant to the principles and 
procedures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its progeny. As a result, this 
court must look to the Executive Branch for direction on the propriety of 
Noriega's immunity claim. 
United States. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added 
and omitted) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 
(1983) (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Enahoro 
v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In our case, we conclude, based on 
the language of the statute, that the FSIA does not apply to General Abubakar [as 
an individual member of a ruling committee, or junta, in Nigeria that exerted 
considerable control over that country]; it is therefore also clear that the Act does 
not provide jurisdiction over the case.”). Specifically, the court in Enahoro said that 
“[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity in the 
scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.” Id. at 
881–82. 
44. See Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211–12 (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486) (“The 
principles of international comity outlined by the Court in The Schooner Exchange led to 
the development of a general doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity which courts 
applied most often to protect foreign nations in their corporate form from civil process 
in the United States. . . . As this doctrine emerged, the ‘Court consistently . . . deferred 
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive 
Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and 
their instrumentalities.’”); see also infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (explaining 
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Aristide, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
found that the US executive branch’s suggestion of immunity for 
defendant Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whom it recognized as the 
official head of state of Haiti, was conclusive: “The [US] State 
Department [within the executive branch] has submitted a letter 
of immunity. It speaks for the President of the United States. Its 
suggestion of immunity is controlling with respect to President 
Aristide. The court must defer to the Executive on this matter.”45 
Additionally, in Ye v. Zemin, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit considered the US executive branch’s suggestion 
of immunity for Chinese head of state Jiang Zemin to be 
conclusive: “In the present case the Executive Branch has 
recognized the immunity of President Jiang from the [plaintiff’s] 
suit. The district court was correct to accept this recognition as 
conclusive.”46 Moreover, in Tachiona v. Mugabe, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York granted immunity to the 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Foreign Minister 
Stan Mudenge for various crimes as a result of the US executive 
branch’s suggestion of immunity.47 The court commented that 
 
that judicial deference to suggestions of immunity by the executive branch applies in the 
particular context of head-of-state immunity); supra notes 23–25. 
45. 844 F. Supp. 128, 139–40 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Plaintiff Lafontant sued President of 
Haiti Aristide for his alleged role in ordering the execution of plaintiff’s husband. 
Aristide apparently had this execution carried out by other officers in his government 
because plaintiff’s husband participated in a failed coup aimed at ousting Aristide from 
power. See id. at 130. 
46. 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he immunity of foreign leaders remains 
the province of the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch's determination that a 
foreign leader should be immune from suit even when the leader is accused of acts that 
violate jus cogens norms is established by a suggestion of immunity.”). In Ye, plaintiffs, 
who were members of a Chinese spiritual movement known as the Falun Gong, sued 
Chinese President Zemin for acts of “torture, genocide, arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, as well as other claims related to the [plaintiffs’] freedom of conscience, 
movement, and religion.” Id. at 622. 
47. 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In that case, “[p]laintiffs charge[d] 
that defendants’ lawless conduct included ‘murder, torture, terrorism, rape, beatings, 
and destruction of property.” Id. at 265. Plaintiffs were persecuted as a result of their 
status as members of the political opposition in Zimbabwe at the time. See id. at 265–66; 
see also First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1121 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(finding that defendants were not entitled to head-of-state immunity, in part because the 
US executive branch did not issue a suggestion of immunity on their behalf); Estate of 
Domingo v. Republic of the Phillippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Wash. 1982) 
(denying head-of-state immunity to former President Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Phillippines, in part because the US State Department failed to file a suggestion of 
immunity on his behalf at the time of the suit, after he had left office). For a list of other 
  
344 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:332 
“the FSIA does not serve to abrogate the State Department’s 
decisive role in the recognition of head-of-state immunity, nor to 
negate the head-of-state immunity invoked here by the State 
Department on behalf of [the Zimbabwean officials].”48 
When the Executive Branch does not put forth a suggestion 
of immunity, some courts undertake an independent analysis of 
the immunity issue. For example, in a case involving alleged 
embezzlement of funds by the former President of the 
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals suggested in dicta that: “[w]hen lacking guidance from 
the executive branch [on the head-of-state immunity issue], as 
here, a court is left to decide for itself whether a head-of-state is 
or is not entitled to immunity.”49 Despite this suggestion by the 
court, it ultimately declined to reach the merits of the head-of-
state immunity issue for former President Marcos.50 Rather, the 
court held that the successor government in the Philippines 
waived Marcos’ head-of-state immunity.51 
Furthermore, in Spacil v. Crowe, though the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit believed it must follow the executive 
branch’s suggestion of immunity when it exists,52 the court also 
found that absent such a suggestion, the judicial branch may 
 
cases in which US courts followed the executive branch’s suggestion of immunity, see 
Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 287. 
48. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d. at 296–97. 
49. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988). The suit arose because Marcos 
refused to respond to a subpoena requiring him to turn over certain bank records. Id. at 
42. 
50. Id. at 45. The court declined to reach the merits of the head-of-state immunity 
issue because it believed either Congress or the President were, under the US 
Constitution, the branches of government both authorized and best suited to address 
such an issue. Id. 
51. Id. at 46. 
52. 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The precedents are overwhelming. For 
more than 160 years American courts have consistently applied the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity when requested to do so by the executive branch. Moreover, they have done 
so with no further review of the executive’s determination.”) The court in Spacil found 
that the executive branch’s suggestion of immunity was controlling and held that “the 
executive’s decision to recognize and allow a claim of foreign sovereign immunity binds 
the judiciary, and that no further review of the executive’s action is dictated.” Id. at 620–
21. The court based its holding primarily “on the role of secrecy in foreign relations.” Id. 
at 620. It believed that the executive branch was in the best position to make an 
immunity determination because the foreign relations power was assigned to that 
branch by the Constitution; in addition, the executive had both more expertise and 
resources in dealing with a foreign relations question such as an immunity 
determination. Id. at 619. 
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make its own determination of immunity: “We do not doubt the 
propriety of courts deciding questions of sovereign immunity, 
absent executive recognition and allowance of a claim. This has 
been the traditional and accepted practice of the courts.”53 
Finally, in United States v. Noriega, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit applied the approach suggested in Spacil by 
independently evaluating whether defendant Panamanian 
General Noriega was entitled to head-of-state immunity.54 The 
court found that, based on certain evaluation criteria such as 
Noriega’s status and the nature of his acts, he was not entitled to 
such immunity: 
[G]iven that the record indicates that Noriega never served 
as the constitutional leader of Panama, that Panama has not 
sought immunity for Noriega and that the charged acts 
relate to Noriega’s private pursuit of personal enrichment 
[e.g., drug trafficking], Noriega likely would not prevail even 
if this court had to make an independent determination 
regarding the propriety of immunity in this case.55 
Before offering this independent evaluation of the head-of-
state issue, however, the Court found that the US executive 
branch had indicated through its actions that defendant should 
not be entitled to immunity: “[B]y pursuing Noriega’s capture 
and this prosecution [on drug trafficking charges], the Executive 
Branch has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be 
denied head-of-state immunity.”56 
 
53. Id. at 618. 
54. 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997). 
55. Id. at 1212 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)). For a summary of 
the charges related to drug trafficking for which the district court convicted Noriega, see 
id. at 1209 n.1. Noriega’s official title in Panama at the time of his indictment in the 
United States on the drug-related charges was “commander of the Panamanian Defense 
Forces in the Republic of Panama.” Id. Also, at this time, the United States recognized 
Eric Arturo Delvalle as the constitutional leader of Panama. Id. at 1209–10. The US 
government had seized Noriega in Panama and brought him back to US soil to face the 
drug charges. See id. 
56. Id. at 1212. After noting that the executive branch’s input on the head-of-state 
issue can fall within one of three categories (i.e., expressly suggest immunity, expressly 
decline immunity, or offer no guidance), the court in Noriega interpreted the holding of 
a precedent case—In re Doe—to be “that absent a formal suggestion of immunity, a 
putative head of state should receive no immunity.” Id. (citing Doe, 860 F.2d at 45). 
Applying this standard, the Noriega court believed that the executive branch, through its 
actions, clearly manifested its intent that Noriega be denied immunity. Id. While this 
may be one interpretation of Doe, it should be emphasized that in that case the court 
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Notably, head-of-state status for purposes of the immunity 
determination attaches only to those individuals whom the US 
executive branch recognizes as legitimately holding that status.57 
For example, in United States v. Noriega, the district court 
commented: 
In order to assert head of state immunity, a government 
official must be recognized as a head of state. Noriega has 
never been recognized as Panama’s Head of State . . . by the 
United States. . . . [T]he United States government has never 
accorded Noriega head of state status, but rather continued 
to recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate 
leader of Panama while Noriega was in power.58 
Moreover, in Lafontant v. Aristide, the district court found 
the fact that defendant Aristide was in exile from Haiti and did 
not actually control that country’s government to be irrelevant to 
the determination of head-of-state status; rather, the controlling 
factor for the court was the designation of head-of-state status by 
the US executive branch: 
[Head-of-state] immunity extends only to the person the 
United States government acknowledges as the official head-
of-state. Recognition of a government and its officers is the 
exclusive function of the Executive Branch. Whether the 
recognized head-of-state [e.g., Aristide] has de facto control of 
the government is irrelevant; the courts must defer to the 
Executive determination.59 
 
denied immunity based on the formal waiver by the Philippine government of 
defendant Marcos’s immunity. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
57. See PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW, 
HISTORY AND ANAYLYSIS 267–68 (2009). 
58. 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fl. 1990). The court also explained that 
defendant Noriega was also not recognized as head of state by the Panamanian 
Constitution. See id. The court found that “[t]he ruling in [Republic of Panama v. Air 
Panama, 745 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1988)]—which [it] [found] no reason to depart 
from here—was based on a line of case law holding that recognition of foreign 
governments and their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy decision committed to 
the Executive Branch and thus conclusive upon the courts.” Id. at 1519–20 (citing Ex 
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 
304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937); Jones v. 
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212–14 (1890); Banco De Espana v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 114 
F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1940); Republic of Panama v. Citizens and Southern Int’l Bank, 
682 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fl. 1988)). 
59. 844 F. Supp. 128, 132–33 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The court also noted that “[US p]residential decisions 
  
2011] HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY AFTER SAMANTAR 347 
Finally, in Kadic v. Karadžić, the court refused to recognize 
defendant Radovan Karadžić as a head of state because the US 
executive branch had yet to confer such status on defendant: 
Even if such future recognition [of head-of-state status for 
Karadžić], determined by the Executive Branch, would 
create head-of-state immunity, it would be entirely 
inappropriate for a court to create the functional equivalent 
of such an immunity based on speculation about what the 
Executive Branch might do in the future.60 
Moreover, foreign governments may choose to waive the 
immunity ordinarily attaching to their heads of state.61 For 
example, in Aristide, the court determined that the de facto 
military rulers of Haiti had not “waived” defendant Aristide’s 
immunity as a sitting head of state: “Here there has been no 
explicit waiver of President Aristide’s immunity recognized as a 
waiver by the United States. . . . [T]he unrecognized de facto 
rulers of Haiti have no power to and have not undertaken any 
action accepted by our government as an implicit waiver of 
immunity.”62 However, in two other cases, foreign governments 
were found to have waived the immunity of their leaders. In a 
case examining the possible head-of-state immunity of former 
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the successor 
government of the Philippines had waived Marcos’s immunity: 
We think the waiver [of immunity] should be given full 
effect. Head-of-state immunity is founded on the need for 
comity among nations and respect for the sovereignty of 
other nations; it should apply only when it serves those goals. 
In this case, application of the doctrine to Ferdinand . . . 
Marcos would clearly offend the present Philippine 
government, which has sought to waive . . . Marcos’ 
immunity, and would therefore undermine the international 
comity that the immunity doctrine is designed to promote. 
Our view is that head-of-state immunity is primarily an 
 
to recognize a government are binding on the courts, and the courts must give them 
legal effect.” Id. at 133 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942)). 
60. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Mexico v. Hoffman, 
324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988); Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 
133). 
61. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 133 (“The government of a foreign state which is 
recognized by the Executive Branch may waive its head-of-state immunity.”). 
62. Id. at 134. 
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attribute of state sovereignty, not an individual right. Respect 
for Philippine sovereignty requires us to honor the 
Philippine government’s revocation of the head-of-state 
immunity of Mr. . . . Marcos.63 
Moreover, in Paul v. Avril, the District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida found that former President of Haiti Prosper 
Avril was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for the alleged 
atrocities committed under his leadership because the 
government of Haiti had waived his immunity.64 
C. Former Heads of State 
Former heads of state are generally denied immunity in US 
courts for acts committed outside their official capacities while in 
office (e.g., “private” acts).65 For example, courts may deny 
immunity to “a former head-of-state [who committed while in 
office] private or criminal acts in violation of American law.”66 
 
63. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110–11 (4th Cir. 1987). Marcos 
was seeking immunity from process. Both Marcos and his wife had been subpoenaed to 
testify before a US grand jury on alleged corruption charges. See id. at 1109–10. 
64. 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fl. 1993). The court said: “Defendant [Avril] next 
argues that he is immune from the jurisdictional arm of this court under the Head of 
State doctrine. This argument must also fail.” Id. at 211. The court concluded that 
“[t]he waiver of immunity by the Haitian government is complete and also affects 
[defendant’s] residual head of state immunity.” Id. For the precise language of the 
waiver by the Aristide government, see id. at 210. In the waiver, defendant is referred to 
as “ex-Lieutenant-General of the Armed Forces of Haiti and former President of the 
Military Government of the Republic of Haiti.” Id. According to plaintiffs’ complaint, 
plaintiffs sought money damages in their suit against defendant Avril for “[t]orture; 
[a]rbitrary [d]etention; [c]ruel, [i]nhuman and [d]egrading [t]reatment; [f]alse 
[i]mprisonment; [a]ssault and [b]attery; and [i]ntentional [i]nfliction of [e]motional 
[d]istress.” Id. at 209. Defendant allegedly ordered others to commit these acts. See id. 
65. See HENNER, supra note 57, at 264 (“Head of state immunity extends only to the 
current head of state; it does not extend to former presidents or prime ministers.”). 
Courts appear to use a common-law approach to immunity for former heads of state and 
do not rely upon FSIA. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464 Reporter’s Note 14 (1987) 
(“Former heads of state or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in 
respect of claims arising out of their official acts while in office.”). 
66. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]ere we to reach the merits of the 
issue, we believe there is respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a 
former head-of-state for private or criminal acts in violation of American law.” (citing 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135, 144 (1812); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1111; Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 
(2d Cir. 1986)); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporter’s Note 14 (1987) 
(“Former heads of state or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in 
respect of claims arising out of their official acts while in office.”). The immunity 
conferred on former heads of state or high officials, however, does not extend to 
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Such denial of immunity has also occurred when the US 
executive branch failed to make a suggestion of immunity on 
behalf of a former head of state.67 Former heads of state may, 
however, claim immunity for acts committed in their official 
capacity while in office.68 
D. Foreign Official Immunity and FSIA 
Most recently, in Samantar v. Yousuf, the US Supreme Court 
held that, similar to the case of foreign heads of state, FSIA 
immunity does not apply to individual foreign government 
officials.69 This holding represents a significant departure from 
previous federal lower court jurisprudence finding foreign 
government officials immune under FSIA for acts committed 
within their official capacity.70 In particular, the Court “agree[d] 
 
violations of international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 404. The court in Doe 
did not reach the actual merits of the issue of former head-of-state immunity for the ex-
leader of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, because it found that the successor 
Philippine government waived Marcos’s immunity. Id. at 45–46. For further discussion of 
Doe, see supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782 
(W.D. Wash. 1988) (denying immunity from suit for former President of the Philippines 
Ferdinand Marcos). Estate of Domingo also held that “[h]ead of state immunity serves to 
safeguard the relations among foreign governments and their leaders, not as [Marcos] 
assert[s], to protect former heads of state regardless of their lack of official status.” Id. at 
786. Concerning the immunity question, the district court in Estate of Domingo found 
determinative the fact that the US government had not proffered a suggestion of 
immunity for Marcos after he left office. Id. The suit against Marcos and other 
defendants was for allegedly “plan[ing], execut[ing] and cover[ing] up the murder of 
two Filipino union leaders . . . who openly and actively opposed the Marcos regime.” Id. 
at 783; see CARTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 628. (“Similar to the situation with the 
present head of state, most courts look to the Executive Branch for guidance [to resolve 
the issue of former-head-of-state immunity].”). 
68. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464, Reporter’s Note 14. (“Former heads of state 
or government have sometimes sought immunity from suit in respect of claims arising 
out of their official acts while in office.”) Note, however, that while a state may not 
generally legislate on the former-head-of-state immunity issue, its courts may entertain 
claims on the issue. See id. (“Ordinarily, such [official] acts [carrying potential immunity 
for the former head of state] are not within the jurisdiction to prescribe of other states. 
However, a former head of state appears to have no immunity from jurisdiction to 
adjudicate.”). 
69. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
70. Prior to the US Supreme Court decision in Samantar, there was a split between 
US circuit courts of appeals, but a noticeable trend among these courts was that FSIA 
immunity did apply to individual foreign government officers for their official acts. See 
HENNER, supra note 57, at 259 (“The principle that an individual can assert FSIA 
immunity for actions taken within his or her official capacity has been upheld by at least 
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with the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals on its broader ground 
that individual officials are not covered by the FSIA . . . .”71 The 
Court based its holding on the language, purpose, and history of 
FSIA itself: 
 Although Congress clearly intended [through its passage of 
FSIA] to supersede the common-law regime for claims 
against foreign states, we find nothing in the statute’s origin 
 
five circuits.”); see, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“We join our sister circuits in holding that an individual official of a 
foreign state acting in his official capacity is the ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state, 
and is thereby protected by the FSIA.”); see also HENNER, supra note 57, at 256–62 & n.57 
(discussing split among circuits). In re Terrorist Attacks involved four Saudi princes, 
among other defendants. Several of these princes apparently held high positions in the 
Saudi government, including Minister of the Interior, Director of the Department of 
General Intelligence, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, and First 
Deputy President of the Council of Ministers. 538 F.3d at 77; see also Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 
515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“An individual qualifies for [FSIA] immunity 
when he acts in his official capacity for the state.” (citing Jungquist v. Al Nahyan, 115 
F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir.1997))); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815–16 
(6th Cir. 2002) (“[N]ormally foreign sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting 
in their official capacities as officers of corporations considered foreign sovereigns.”). In 
Belhas, the circuit court of appeals found that the defendant, a former Israeli military 
general, was immune under the FSIA for official acts he committed that were authorized 
by the Israeli government. The court said, “We have no difficulty in holding . . . that the 
FSIA does not extend jurisdiction [i.e., it confers immunity] over this action against an 
officer for actions committed by the state in whose army he served.” Belhas, 515 F.3d at 
1284. The plaintiffs, who were relatives of citizens killed or injured in a shelling by the 
Israeli military of a United Nations compound in Lebanon, alleged that the defendant’s 
military command responsibility in the shelling constituted “war crimes, extrajudicial 
killing, crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” Id. at 1282. But see Enahoro v. Abubakwar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“In our case, we conclude, based on the language of the statute, that the FSIA 
does not apply to General Abubakwar [as an individual member of a ruling committee, 
or junta, in Nigeria that exerted considerable control over that country]; it is therefore 
also clear that the Act does not provide jurisdiction over the case.”). Specifically, the 
court in Enahoro said that “[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in the 
official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and 
unmistakable terms.” Id. at 881–82. Note that even under the prevailing trend of cases 
described above, if the foreign government official committed an act not in his official 
capacity, FSIA immunity was generally denied. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 
1470–71 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that former President Marcos was not entitled to FSIA 
immunity for his authorization while in office of torture, arbitrary detentions, and 
extrajudicial executions, because these acts do not constitute official acts of state); 
Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the daughter of 
former President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos was not entitled to FSIA 
immunity because the crimes she committed were not official acts of the state). For 
further discussion of these cases involving the Marcos family, see HENNER, supra note 57, 
at 260. 
71. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. at 2284 n.5. 
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or aims to indicate that Congress similarly wanted to codify 
the law of foreign official immunity. Our review of the text, 
purpose, and history of the FSIA leads us to the conclusion 
that . . . the FSIA does not govern [the defendant foreign 
official’s] claim of immunity.72 
Notably, Samantar involved a foreign official who allegedly 
committed crimes against the plaintiff victims both while a head 
of state (i.e., Prime Minister of Somalia) and while a 
governmental official of that state (i.e., First Vice President and 
Minister of Defense of Somalia).73 The holding in Samantar will 
likely widen the scope of permissible suits against foreign 
government officials because these officials will no longer enjoy 
immunity under the FSIA; however, they will apparently continue 
to be subject to potential grants of immunity under the common 
law.74 
II. HEAD OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACH 
A. International Case Law 
1. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium 
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge, Mr. Vandermeersch, 
issued an international arrest warrant for the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi.75 The warrant sought extradition of Yerodia 
for alleged breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and 
 
72. Id. at 2292. 
73. Id. at 2282. The crimes alleged by the plaintiffs included torture, extrajudicial 
killing, and arbitrary detention, and plaintiffs sought money damages from defendant in 
his personal capacity as of result of his alleged authorization of these acts. Id. at 2282, 
2292. 
74. This is analogous to the opportunity for common-law immunity under US law 
enjoyed by foreign heads of state. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. Also, 
cases involving former officials have generally been analyzed under the common law and 
not under the FSIA. For cases analyzing former heads of state immunity under a 
common-law approach, see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. For a case 
analyzing a former official under a common law approach, see Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 
9 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that it is unresolved whether FSIA applies to former officials but 
acknowledging that common-law immunity analysis would apply). See HENNER, supra 
note 57, at 262 (citing Matar, 2009 US App. LEXIS at 7877). 
75. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium) 2002 I.C.J. 3, 
¶¶ 1, 10 (Feb. 14). 
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commission of crimes against humanity.76 Specifically, Yerodia 
was charged with making numerous speeches inciting racial 
hatred during August 1998, punishable in Belgium under the 
Law of June 16, 1993.77 Yerodia was neither a Belgian national 
nor within Belgium territory at the time the arrest warrant was 
circulated.78 The warrant was issued based on complaints filed by 
twelve Belgian citizens, five of whom are of Belgian nationality.79 
On October 17, 2000, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (“Congo”) filed an application with the Registry of the 
International Court of Justice to request that the court order the 
warrant annulled.80 The Congo contended that, by issuing the 
warrant, Belgium violated international law norms concerning 
immunity;81 in particular, that the warrant violated the principle 
that one state may not exercise authority over another.82 To 
support its claim, the Congo relied upon Article 2 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, which establishes the sovereignty of 
member states.83 Additionally, the Congo argued that Yerodia was 
entitled to a claim of immunity under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”).84 
In contrast, Belgium sought to have the ICJ case dismissed, 
contending that, since Yerodia ceased to hold office in mid-April 
2001, the issues before the court were now moot as he no longer 
 
76. Id. ¶ 13. 
77. Id. ¶ 15; Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la repression des infractions graves aux 
Conventions internationales de Genéve du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 
juin 1977, additionnels à ces conventions [Law of 16 June 1993 Relative to the 
Repression of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional to These Conventions], MONITEUR BELGE 
[MB] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 5, 1993, 17751 [hereinafter Law of 16 June 
1993]. Article 7 of this law provides that Belgian courts hold jurisdiction over breaches 
of the Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law wherever they may be 
committed. See id.; see also Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 15. Article 5 of the law 
stipulates that immunity stemming from an individual’s official capacity shall not 
prevent application of the law. Law of 16 June 1993, supra; see also Congo v. Belgium, 2002 
I.C.J. ¶ 15. 
78. Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 15. 
79. Id. The charged offenses were committed outside of Belgian territory. Id. 
80. Id. ¶¶ 1, 32. 
81. Id. ¶ 1. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. In particular, the Congo cited Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”). 
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enjoyed immunity as Minister of Foreign Affairs.85 The ICJ, 
however, ruled against Belgium’s contention, concluding that if 
ICJ jurisdiction existed on the date the case was referred to the 
court, such jurisdictional authority continues regardless of 
subsequent events.86 
Turning to the merits of the case, the court first 
acknowledged that it is firmly established in international law 
that certain high-ranking officers in a state, including heads of 
state and ministers of foreign affairs, enjoy immunity from 
criminal and civil jurisdiction in other states.87 Because there are 
no conventions that speak specifically to the immunity of a 
minister of foreign affairs, the court examined the immunity 
provisions of other international treaties to support its decision.88 
In particular, the court relied upon the preamble of the VCDR 
establishing the overall purposes for diplomatic immunities and 
privileges. One such purpose cited by the court included the 
efficient function and performance of diplomatic missions.89 
According to the court, the VCDR preamble constitutes 
customary international law, a type of law the court reasons it 
must use in the absence of a relevant and applicable 
convention.90 In light of the similar functions of diplomats and 
foreign affairs ministers and the similar need for immunity as a 
result of those functions, the court found that a minister of 
 
85. Id. ¶ 24. 
86. Id. ¶ 26. Both parties agreed that there existed a legal dispute at the time of 
referral of the case to the ICJ (i.e., whether Yerodia enjoyed immunity from prosecution 
as a sitting minister). Id. ¶ 24. Also, both parties agreed that they were bound by their 
previous consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id. ¶ 27. Belgium consented 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on June 17, 1958, and the Congo offered its 
consent to such jurisdiction on February 8, 1989. Id. Additionally, the change in 
Yerodia’s status may have altered part of the case but did not end the dispute, as the 
Congo’s challenge was, and is, in regard to the arrest warrant. Id. ¶ 32. 
87. Id. ¶ 51 (“[I]n international law it is firmly established that . . . certain holders 
of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both 
civil and criminal.”). 
88. Id ¶ 52. 
89. Id.; see Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, pmbl., Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (“[T]he purpose of such [diplomatic] privileges and 
immunities is . . . to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic 
missions as representing states . . . .”). 
90. Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 52. 
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foreign affairs should enjoy full personal immunity, or immunity 
ratione personae, under customary international law.91 
The ICJ next turned to examining customary international 
law with regard to exceptions, or “bars,” to immunity for grave 
international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.92 The court examined state practice through 
investigation into national legislation and decisions by high 
national courts, finding no evidence of this type of criminal 
immunity exception for ministers of foreign affairs in national 
court trials.93 Additionally, the court examined the immunity 
provisions in the statutes of multiple international tribunals and 
again found no mention of exceptions to immunity for these 
crimes in national court trials.94 Thus, the court concluded that a 
sitting minister of foreign affairs, such as Yerodia, maintained 
immunity from trial in a foreign national court for grave 
international crimes. 
Though foreign national courts may not exert jurisdiction 
over sitting ministers of foreign affairs accused of grave 
international crimes, the ICJ pointed out that immunity generally 
does not exist under international law norms if the sitting official 
is prosecuted in his or her own country, ceases to hold the office 
which granted immunity at the time relevant legal proceedings 
commence, is prosecuted before certain international criminal 
courts or tribunals, or if the “home” state waives immunity.95 In 
the case at hand, the court reasoned that, though Yerodia was no 
longer the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of its 
decision, the warrant was issued while he held the position and 
enjoyed the immunities conferred by it.96 The court concluded 
 
91. Id. ¶ 54. The functions of a minister of foreign affairs include diplomatic 
activities, acting as a representative of a sending state, acting on behalf of a sending 
state, and coordinating international relations for a state. Id. ¶ 53. A distinction cannot 
be drawn between official and private acts for the purpose of immunity as arrest for 
either type of act would interfere with the minister’s official functions. Id. ¶ 55. 
92. Id. ¶ 60. 
93. Id. ¶ 58. The court examined rulings from such courts as the English House of 
Lords and French Court of Cassation. Id. 
94. Id. The court examined the statutes of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY, International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, and International Military Tribunal of Tokyo. Id. 
95. Id. ¶ 61. Regarding a former senior foreign official or head of state, he or she 
may be tried for acts committed prior to obtaining or after leaving office, and for such 
acts committed in a private capacity while in office. Id. Immunity would, however, 
continue for official acts performed in office. 
96. Id. ¶ 70. 
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that the mere issuance of the warrant on the part of Belgium 
violated its international obligations to the Congo.97 As a remedy, 
the ICJ ordered Belgium to cancel its warrant and inform the 
appropriate authorities of the cancellation.98 
2. Charles Taylor Immunity Decision 
Starting in the late 1980s, Charles Taylor served as the head 
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (“NPFL”), an organized 
military group.99 Taylor was elected and served as President of 
the Republic of Liberia from August 2, 1997, to approximately 
August 11, 2003.100 While President, Taylor worked with such 
 
97. Id. Namely, Belgium violated its obligation to respect the Congo’s sovereignty. 
Id. 
98. Id. ¶ 76. Another decision regarding the immunity of heads of state and senior 
officials in foreign national courts is pending before the ICJ. See Press Release 2002/37, 
ICJ, The Republic of the Congo Seises the International Court of Justice of a Dispute 
with France (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?pr=60&case=129. The Congo contends that France, in attempting to 
prosecute a Congolese Minister of Interior in a French court for crimes against 
humanity and torture allegedly committed during the execution of his official powers, 
violated “the principle that a State may not, in breach of the principle of sovereign 
equality among all Members of the United Nations . . . exercise its authority on the 
territory of another State.” Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Criminal 
Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.) 3, (Apr. 11, 2003). In addition, the Congo 
contends that France, by seeking to execute a warrant for the Congolese President to 
appear as a witness for police regarding the accusations against the Congolese Minister 
of Interior, violated “the criminal immunity of a foreign Head of State—an international 
customary rule recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court.” Id. The ICJ has issued a 
decision in this case declining to issue a provisional measure to stop the French criminal 
investigation of the Congolese leaders. See Request for the Indication of a Provisional 
Measure, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 102, ¶¶ 4, 
41. This decision still maintains the international law immunities for sitting heads of 
state and senior officials established in Congo v. Belgium. See O’Donnell, supra note 3, at 
413 (“A major distinction, however, is that in [Congo v. Belgium], the concern was that 
any third state could execute an existing international arrest warrant against Yerodia. 
For this reason, the incumbent head of state’s immunity was upheld by denying the 
continued issuance of the international arrest warrant . . . . In this case, it was not the 
chance that any third state would utilize a document that was already in international 
circulation to draw a head of state into its courts. Instead, it was that one state had 
commenced a criminal investigation into another state’s head of state. By permitting the 
investigation in this case to go forward, the ICJ appears to have taken the position that 
any state suspecting another state’s leader of international crimes may proceed with 
investigations, even when the objective of such investigations may be to establish 
liability.”); see also discussion supra note 3. 
99. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second 
Amended Indictment, ¶ 2 (May 29, 2007). 
100. Id ¶ 3. 
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groups as the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”), the RUF/AFRC Junta 
or alliance, and Liberian fighters, including members and ex-
members of the NPFL.101 Taylor supported, commanded, and 
encouraged these groups to carry out a campaign to terrorize the 
civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone.102 
Charles Taylor was indicted by Stephen Rapp, the 
Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, on May 29, 
2007.103 By this time, it had been several years since Taylor had 
resigned as President of Liberia.104 The Prosecutor charged 
Taylor with eleven separate violations of international law as 
provided in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone105: 
(1) acts of terrorism in violation of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (i.e., “war 
crimes”); (2) five counts of crimes against humanity, including 
murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts, and 
enslavement; (3) violence to life, health, and physical or mental 
well-being of persons, including murder (Count 3) and cruel 
treatment (Count 7); and (4) outrages upon personal dignity, 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into 
the armed forces, and pillaging.106 
 
101. Id. ¶ 5. 
102. See id. 
103. See generally id. 
104. See Somini Sengupta, Liberian President Resigns as Peacekeepers Enter Capital, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
940CE6DC1431F93BA3575BC0A9659C8B63&pagewanted=1. 
105. Taylor was charged pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 of the Statute. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Statute provides: “A person who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in . . . the present Statute shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.” Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
art. 6, para. 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Statute 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 provides: 
The fact that any of the [criminal] acts referred to in . . . the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of 
criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior 
had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts 
or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
Id. art. 6, ¶ 3. 
106. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second 
Amended Indictment, ¶ 2 (May 29, 2007). Regarding terrorizing the civilian population: 
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“Members of the RUF, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), 
RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, were assisted and 
encouraged by, acted in concert with, under the direction and/or control of, 
and/or subordinate to [Taylor], burned civilian property . . . as part of a 
campaign to terrorize the civilian population of the Republic of Sierra Leone. 
Id. ¶ 5. 
In regard to murder: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], throughout Sierra Leone, 
unlawfully killed an unknown number of civilians . . . . 
Id. ¶ 9. 
In regard to rape and sexual slavery: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], committed widespread 
acts of violence against civilian women and girls . . . . 
Id. ¶ 14. 
In regard to other inhumane acts: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], committed widespread 
acts of physical violence against citizens . . . . 
Id. ¶ 18. 
In regard to enslavement: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], engaged in widespread 
and large scale abductions of civilians and use of civilians as forced labour . . . . 
Id. ¶ 23. 
In regard to conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into the 
armed forces: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], routinely conscripted, 
enlisted and/or used boys and girls under the age of 15 to participate in active 
hostilities. Many of these children were first abducted then trained in AFRC 
and/or RUF camps in various locations throughout the country, and 
thereafter used as fighters. 
Id. ¶ 22. 
In regard to pillaging: 
Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of the 
RUF, AFRC, RUF/AFRC Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters were 
assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction 
and/or control of, and/or subordinate to [Taylor], engaged in widespread 
unlawful taking of civilian property . . . . 
  
358 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:332 
On July 23, 2003, Taylor’s counsel filed a motion to quash 
the indictment and declare void the arrest warrant on the basis of 
head-of-state immunity.107 On May 31, 2004, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone denied Taylor’s 
motion.108 It pointed out that Article 6 of the Special Court’s 
governing statute stipulates that the official position of an 
accused does not remove individual criminal responsibility.109 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the International Law 
Commission had accepted this restriction on immunity as long 
ago as 1950 during the formation of the Charter for the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.110 Furthermore, the stripping of immunity 
before international judicial bodies for heads of state and other 
government officials has become well established since 1950, as 
evidenced by the governing statutes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the ICC.111 Finally, to further 
support its denial of Taylor’s motion for immunity from 
indictment and arrest, the Appeals Chamber considered the 
reasoning of the ICJ’s decision in Congo v. Belgium.112 Based upon 
the ICJ’s reasoning in that case, the Chamber concluded that 
head-of-state prosecutions by international judicial bodies are 
acceptable.113 International judicial bodies are created by the 
authority of the international community as a whole, and thus do 
not infringe on the principles of sovereignty when passing 
judgment on heads of state and other high officials.114 
 
Id. ¶ 28. 
107. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, 2 (May 31, 2004). 
108. Id. ¶ 60. 
109. Id. ¶ 44. 
110. Id. ¶ 47. 
111. Id. ¶ 45. The court also noted the decreased risk to international peace and 
stability posed by an international trial of a sitting head of state compared to a foreign 
national trial: “[S]tates have considered the collective judgment of the international 
community to provide a vital safeguard against the potential destabilizing effect of 
unilateral [foreign national court] judgment in this area.” Id. ¶ 51 (quoting Professor 
Diane Orentlicher’s amicus brief). 
112. Id. ¶ 50; see supra Part II.A.1. 
113. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, ¶ 52. 
114. Id. Charles Taylor’s trial is still ongoing by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
Due to security concerns with trying Taylor at the court’s headquarters in Sierra Leone, 
the court is using facilities in The Hague for Taylor’s trial. The Prosecutor vs. Charles 
Ghankay Taylor, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/
ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
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B. International Codification and the Developing ICC Case Against 
Sudanese President Al-Bashir 
As explicitly mentioned in the Congo v. Belgium decision, 
international criminal courts, in direct contrast to national courts 
under international law, maintain the authority to prosecute 
sitting heads of state and government officials for grave crimes.115 
For example, the statutes of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY, and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone decline to recognize immunity for 
grave crimes committed by heads of state and other 
governmental officials.116 The ICC recently charged the current 
head of state of Sudan, President Al-Bashir, with grave 
international crimes, including crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and, most recently over the summer of 2010, genocide. 
Thus the ICC has now issued two separate warrants for Al-
Bashir’s arrest.117 
 
According to the court’s website, “The Special Court trial of Charles Ghankay Taylor is 
taking place at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) courtroom in Leidschendam, 
the Netherlands.” Id. 
115. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 
61 (Feb. 14). 
116. Id. For a detailed explanation of the immunity provisions codified in the 
statutes of these respective international tribunals, see infra note 184. 
117. The ICC Prosecutor charged President Al-Bashir, the current head of state of 
Sudan, with grave international crimes, including crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, for his role as an indirect perpetrator and coconspirator of these crimes. The 
Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for Al-Bashir’s arrest. See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, 
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009). The prosecutor charged 
Al-Bashir with the following war crimes: pillaging and intentionally directing attacks 
against civilians. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. The prosecutor charged Al-Bashir with the following crimes 
against humanity: murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape. Id. ¶¶ 7–
8. In the summer of 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a second arrest warrant for Al-
Bashir for the crime of genocide. Al-Bashir is charged with three counts of genocide. See 
Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 
2010). Significantly, the Chamber found the necessary genocidal intent to charge al-
Bashir with genocide. See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 5–6 (July 12, 2010). 
In the Sudan, government military and police forces as well as local militias such as the 
Janjaweed, who are armed and often commanded by the government, have burned and 
looted rebel villages, raped women, killed people, and forced survivors to flee to Chad. 
John Ryle, Disaster in Darfur, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 55. The Sudanese 
government has undertaken these violent actions in response to demands from rebel 
groups in the Darfur region of the Sudan for greater representation. Id. 
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III. HEAD OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY: 
FOREIGN NATIONAL APPROACHES 
A. United Kingdom: The Case against Augusto Pinochet 
Augusto Pinochet led a coup d’etat against Chilean 
President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973 to claim the 
presidency.118 While Pinochet was in office, barbaric acts were 
committed within Chile, including torture, murder, and the 
unexplained disappearance of individuals en masse.119 Pinochet 
apparently instigated and had knowledge of these crimes.120 On 
October 16, 1998, Spain issued an international arrest warrant 
for Pinochet while the former president was in England receiving 
medical treatment.121 This action, in turn, led a London 
magistrate to issue a provisional warrant for Pinochet under the 
Extradition Act of 1989.122 Pinochet was arrested on October 17, 
1998 in a London hospital.123 Following Pinochet’s arrest, Spain 
issued a second warrant on October 18, which charged Pinochet 
with five offenses, and an English magistrate issued a second 
provisional warrant on October 22.124 
 
118. R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) 
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190 (appeal taken from Divisional Court of the 
Queen’s Bench). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 191. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. The English magistrate warrant of October 22, 1998 reads: 
(1) Between 1 January 1988 and December 1992 being a public official 
intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering on another in the performance 
or purported performance of his official duties; (2) between 1 January 1988 
and 31 December 1992 being a public official, conspired with persons 
unknown to intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering on another in the 
performance or purported performance of his official duties; (3) between 1 
January 1982 and 31 January 1992 he detained other persons (the hostages) 
and in order to compel such persons to do or to abstain from doing any act 
threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain the hostages; (4) between 1 
January 1982 and 31 January 1992 conspired with persons unknown to detain 
other persons (the hostages) and in order to compel such persons to do or to 
abstain from doing any act, threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain the 
hostages;(5) between January 1976 and December 1992 conspired together 
with persons unknown to commit murder in a Convention country. 
Id. 
  
2011] HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY AFTER SAMANTAR 361 
In response, Pinochet’s counsel filed habeas corpus 
petitions challenging both provisional warrants.125 On October 
28, 1998, the divisional court in England quashed both 
warrants.126 The second warrant was quashed on the grounds that 
Pinochet enjoyed immunity as a former head of state and that 
certain alleged offenses were non-extradition crimes under the 
Extradition Act of 1989.127 
The Crown Prosecution Service, on behalf of the 
Government of Spain, appealed the divisional court’s ruling to 
the Lords of Appeal.128 Before the appeal was heard, Spain issued 
a formal Request for Extradition on November 4, 1998, 
expanding the list of alleged offenses.129 The appeal was first 
heard by the Lords between November 4 and 12, 1998, resulting 
in a judgment on November 25 denying Pinochet immunity for 
crimes under international law.130 This judgment, however, was 
set aside on January 15, 1999 on the grounds that the Committee 
of Lords that rendered the decision was improperly 
constituted.131 
Following the setting aside of the initial judgment, another 
appeal was filed in the House of Lords on January 18, 1999.132 
Before this appeal was heard, however, British Home Secretary 
Jack Straw ordered a magistrate judge to authorize extradition 
proceedings under the Extradition Act of 1989 for all charges 
except genocide.133 Additionally, the Republic of Chile, which 
argued for Pinochet’s immunity, was added as a party to the 
litigation.134 Chile also sought to alter the charges against 
Pinochet.135 
 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. Certain offenses were deemed to be nonextraditable as they were not 
crimes in England on the date they were alleged to have been committed. Id. 
128. Id. The point of law on appeal was “the proper interpretation and scope of the 
immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in 
the United Kingdom with respect to acts committed while he was head of state.” Id. 
129. Id. at 191–92. 
130. Id. at 192. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. Straw relied in part on the previous decision of the House of Lords, finding 
that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity in issuing authorization to the magistrate to 
proceed. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. Chile sought to alter the charges as follows: 
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Concerning the appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson analyzed both the nature of the charged offenses and 
the status of former-head-of-state immunity to determine if 
Pinochet could indeed be extradited to Spain.136 According to 
Wilkinson, any crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet that were 
not crimes under English law at the time of their commission 
cannot be considered extraditable.137 The Extradition Act 1989 
requires extraditable offenses to have dual-criminality, meaning 
the acts must be crimes both in England and in the location 
where the acts were committed.138 This meant that Pinochet 
 
Charges 1, 2 and 5: conspiracy to torture between 1 January 1972 and 20 
September 1973 and between 1 August 1973 and 1 January 1990; 
Charge 3: conspiracy to take hostages between 1 August 1973 and 1 January 
1990; 
Charge 4: conspiracy to torture in furtherance of which murder was 
committed in various countries including Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, 
between 1 January 1972 and 1 January 1990; 
Charges 6 and 8: torture between 1 August 1973 and 8 August 1973 and on 11 
September 1973; 
Charges 9 and 12: conspiracy to murder in Spain between 1 January 1975 and 
31 December 1976 and in Italy on 6 October 1975; 
Charges 10 and 11: attempted murder in Italy on 6 October 1975; 
Charges 13–29; and 31–32: torture on various occasions between 11 September 
1973 and May 1977; 
Charge 30: torture on 24 June 1989. 
Id. at 192–93. 
136. Id. at 193. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. The provisions of the Extradition Act 1989 are as follows: 
(1) In this Act, except in Schedule 1, 'extradition crime' means— 
  (a) conduct in the territory of a foreign state, a designated Commonwealth 
country or a colony which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would 
constitute an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, 
or any greater punishment, and which, however described in the law of the 
foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony, is so punishable under that 
law; 
  (b) an extraterritorial offence against the law of a foreign state, designated 
Commonwealth country or colony which is punishable under that law with 
imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment, and which 
satisfies— 
     (i) the condition specified in subsection (2) below; or 
     (ii) all the conditions specified in subsection (3) below. 
(2) The condition mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i) above is that in 
corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute an 
extraterritorial offence against the law of the United Kingdom punishable with 
imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment. 
(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(ii) above are— 
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could not be extradited for alleged offenses related to torture 
that occurred before September 29, 1988, which was the date the 
United Kingdom ratified the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“Torture Convention” or “Convention”); however, alleged acts 
of torture and conspiracy to commit torture committed by 
Pinochet after September 29, 1988, remained extraditable 
offenses.139 
For the Torture Convention and related torture provisions 
in English law to apply, Pinochet must be considered either a 
public official or a person acting in an official capacity.140 Both 
Pinochet and representatives of Chile conceded that, should the 
alleged acts be proved, they were carried out by a public official 
or person acting in an official capacity.141 Agreeing with this 
concession, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that a finding that 
a head of state such as Pinochet was not a public official would 
result in no person being guilty under the Torture Convention.142 
 
  (a) that the foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony bases its 
jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender; 
  (b) that the conduct constituting the offence occurred outside the United 
Kingdom; and 
  (c) that, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would constitute an 
offence under the law of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment 
for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment.” 
Extradition Act, 1989, c. 33 § 2 (Eng.). 
139. R v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) (No.3), 
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 197 (appeal taken from Divisional Court of the Queen’s 
Bench). Note that charges of alleged hostage-taking were also non-extraditable as they 
were not offenses under the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982. Id. With regard to the 
revised charges, only charge 9 and parts of charges 2, 4, and 30 committed prior to 
September 29, 1988, were extraditable. Id. 
140. Id. at 199 (“Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as the intentional 
infliction of severe pain and of suffering with a view to achieving a wide range of 
purposes ‘when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.’”); see also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-22, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Similarly, Section 134 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1988 
requires that acts of torture be carried out by or with the instigation or consent of a 
public official or person acting in an official capacity. Id. at 231; see also Criminal Justice 
Act, 1988, c. 33 § 134 (“A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever 
his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he 
intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or 
purported performance of his official duties.”). 
141. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 200. 
142. Id. 
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Such a finding would be problematic because Chile, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom, as state parties to the Convention, are 
obligated either to prosecute or extradite Convention violators.143 
Lastly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson examined the extent of 
Pinochet’s immunity as a former head of state.144 A basic 
principle of international law holds that one sovereign shall not 
adjudicate the conduct of another.145 The immunity from foreign 
state jurisdiction extends to sitting heads of state and 
ambassadors, rendering them immune from all judicial actions 
or prosecutions by foreign states.146 The immunities enjoyed by 
sitting heads of state and ambassadors are complete with regard 
to both civil and criminal offenses and are attached to the 
officials themselves.147 Former heads of state retain a limited 
amount of immunity for official acts carried out while in office.148 
Pinochet, as a former Chilean head of state, enjoys 
immunity in relation to official acts performed while in office.149 
Lord Brown-Wilkinson, however, found strong evidence to 
suggest that Pinochet’s immunity does not protect him from 
prosecution under the Torture Convention.150 According to 
Wilkinson, individual criminal responsibility for those who violate 
international law is well established.151 In particular, Lord Brown-
Wilkinson doubted that even before the establishment of the 
Torture Convention, torture could be considered an official state 
function.152 Actions such as torture which are universally 
prohibited by international law cannot be considered official 
functions.153 Additionally, an essential element of torture under 
 
143. Id. at 199. 
144. Id. at 201–05. 
145. Id. at 201. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. Immunity which attaches to the officials themselves regardless of the 
nature of their actions is known as immunity ratione personae. Id. at 202. 
148. Id. Immunity which attaches only to the official acts of an official is referred to 
as immunity ratione materiae. Id. Lord Brown-Wilkinson found that heads of state lose 
their immunity ratione personae, or personal immunity, when leaving office. Id. (citing 
Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Government 
and Foreign Ministers, 247 Receuil des Cours 9, 88 (1994)). 
149. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 202–03 (appeal 
taken from Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 204 (citing the reasoning of Watts, supra note 148). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 205. 
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the Torture Convention is that it be carried out by or under the 
order of a public official.154 If Pinochet had organized and 
authorized torture after the enactment of the Torture 
Convention in the United Kingdom, he was not acting in any 
capacity that triggered immunity. Thus, Pinochet, as a former 
head of state, could be extradited for acts of torture and 
conspiracy to commit torture he allegedly committed after 
September 29, 1988 (the United Kingdom’s date of ratification of 
the Convention).155 
In March 1999, the House of Lords upheld the validity of 
Spain’s warrant and ordered Pinochet’s extradition.156 British 
Home Secretary Straw, however, doubted Pinochet’s ability to 
stand trial. Indeed, on January 11, 2000, Straw informed 
Pinochet’s counsel and those representing Spain that he had 
ordered a medical examination to discern Pinochet’s 
competency to stand trial.157 The first indication of his failing 
health was on October 6, 1999, when the Bow Street Magistrate 
excused him from appearing at the judgment stage of the trial.158 
Following this incident, Straw received information from the 
Chilean Embassy on October 14 indicating a significant 
deterioration in Pinochet’s health.159 Based on the excusal from 
proceedings and the report filed by the Chilean Embassy, Straw 
invited Pinochet to submit to a medical examination, to which he 
consented.160 On January 11 and 12, Straw announced that the 
 
154. Id. 
155. Id. However, Lord Brown-Wilkinson found no reason Pinochet should not 
enjoy immunity with regard to the crimes of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 
See id; see also LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 775 (2d ed. 2009) (“Lord Brown-
Wilkinson accepted that torture was a jus cogens crime. But he also concluded that the 
British courts exercise jurisdiction over [Pinochet for the purpose of ordering his 
extradition to Spain to face the relevant charges] only for tortuous acts occurring after 
the coming into force of the Torture Convention for Chile, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.”). 
156. Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 205. 
157. 2 Mar. 2000, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2000) 358W–371W (U.K.), ¶ 5, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000302/
text/00302w09.htm#00302w09.html_spnew3 [hereinafter Straw Extradition Statement]. 
158. Id. ¶ 9. Pinochet was excused from attendance based on evidence produced by 
the general practitioner who attended the senator. Id. 
159. Id. ¶ 10. 
160. Id. An independent medical team was formed to obtain an independent 
report of relevant clinical facts. Id. The team consisted of Sir John Grimley Evans and 
Dr. Michael Denham, geriatric specialists; Professor Andrew Lees, specialist in 
movement disorders and dementia; and Dr. Maria Wyke, neuropsychologist. Id. These 
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medical reports indicated that Pinochet was unfit to stand trial.161 
In his opinion, trying Pinochet would be a violation of Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to a 
fair trial).162 
B. Spain and Germany 
In the aftermath of the ground-breaking Pinochet decision, 
countries such as Spain and Germany began to take a more 
aggressive stance towards the prosecution of former heads of 
state and senior foreign officials under universal jurisdiction 
principles. For example, under Spain’s universal jurisdiction 
criminal statute, its courts have entertained lawsuits against a 
former Chinese head of state for genocide in Tibet, Guatemalan 
generals for various international crimes against the Mayan 
people, and actually convicted a former Argentine military 
officer for his commission of crimes against humanity in 
Argentina.163 Notably, Spain places certain limitations upon its 
exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction, including a bar of 
prosecution on sitting heads of state and senior governmental 
officials.164 In addition, Spanish courts will defer to criminal 
 
examiners were asked to evaluate Pinochet specifically with regard to his ability to follow 
questioning, recall events, and give coherent evidence. Id. ¶ 11. The examination took 
place over a period of six hours on January 5, 2000 at Northwick Park hospital in 
London. Id. ¶ 13. 
161. Id. ¶ 14. The medical examiners were convinced that Pinochet was not faking 
his disability nor was it likely to improve significantly. Id. 
162. Id. ¶ 20. In June 2000, a Chilean court stripped Pinochet of immunity from 
prosecution; the Supreme Court of Chile upheld the decision in August 2000. Timeline: 
The Pinochet Legal Saga, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1209914.stm 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2010). In August 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court decision. Id. 
163. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 776; see also Ley Orgánica del Poder 
Judicial [Organic Law of Judicial Power] art. 23(4) (B.O.E. 1985, 157 (Spain). For a 
translation of Article 23(4) of Spain’s Organic Law of Judicial Power, see LUC REYDAMS, 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 183 
(2003) (“Spanish courts have jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by Spaniards and 
foreigners, if these acts constitute any of the following offenses under Spanish law: (a) 
genocide; (b) terrorism; (c) sea or air piracy; (d) counterfeiting; (e) offenses in 
connection with prostitution and corruption of minors and incompetents; (f) drug 
trafficking; [and] (g) any other offense which Spain is obliged to prosecute under an 
international treaty or Convention.”). 
164.  HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155at 777 (citing Mugambi Jouet, Spain’s Expanded 
Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights Abuses in Latin America, China and Beyond, 
35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 495, 497, 511–13 (2007)). 
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prosecutions by international tribunals.165 Finally, under the 
subsidiarity principle, Spanish courts must generally defer to on-
going or impending foreign national prosecutions in the 
territorial state of the crime; however, “they need not defer to 
such proceedings when ‘serious and reasonable proofs of judicial 
inactivity [demonstrate] a fault, whether of will or of capacity, to 
effectively prosecute the crimes.’”166 
Similarly, German courts have the authority to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes with no 
actual connection to that nation. In fact, “the German Code of 
Crimes Against International Law, enacted on June 30, 2002, 
creates universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.”167 The German prosecutor has wide 
discretion under this statute to commence a criminal 
proceeding; however, there are certain factors that limit this 
discretion: 
 The German federal prosecutor will only exercise universal 
jurisdiction if the competent authorities of the territorial 
state, or of the state of nationality of the suspect or victim, 
refrain from carrying out a genuine investigation and where 
the International Criminal Court or another competent 
international tribunal does not investigate the case.168 
Notably, the German prosecutor applied these limiting 
factors, which together form the “subsidiarity” principle, in a 
case brought by Iraqi nationals against former US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other US military officials for 
alleged torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.169 As a result of 
his application of the subsidiarity principle, the German 
prosecutor chose not to proceed against the US officials: 
[T]he prosecutor argued that the crimes referred to in the 
complaint (war crimes against persons and grievous bodily 
harm), were already under investigation by US authorities 
and therefore the principle of subsidiarity would not permit 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (quoting Jouet, supra note 164, at 511–13). Another limitation concerning 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spanish courts is that “defendants may not be 
tried in absentia.” Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE 
STATE OF THE ART 65 (2006)). This is the “subsidiarity” principle. 
169. Id. 
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German authorities to investigate the complaint. According 
to the prosecutor’s argument, the principle of subsidiarity 
does not permit national authorities to take into account 
whether national authorities are investigating the individual 
referred to in the complaint but rather whether the US 
authorities were investigating the complex as a whole.170 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The doctrines of foreign head-of-state immunity and foreign 
official immunity in the United States are in a state of disarray. In 
light of the overall dearth of precedent cases in the head-of-state 
context, it is exceedingly difficult to predict an outcome in any 
current case, particularly when the US Executive Branch declines 
to make an immunity recommendation. Regarding official 
immunity, Samantar appears to have removed the increased 
precision and certainty of outcome that the FSIA offered for the 
foreign official immunity inquiry. After Samantar, similar to the 
head-of-state immunity inquiry, foreign official immunity will be 
evaluated under the more nebulous common-law standards.171 In 
addition, Samantar may increase the likelihood of suits against 
foreign government officials by removing FSIA’s protective cloak 
of immunity. Thus, what is needed is a clear set of criteria, or 
guidelines, for US courts to use when confronted with an 
immunity claim by a foreign head of state or foreign 
governmental official. Such criteria could be fashioned by either 
US courts through the development of common-law precedent 
or through the legislative codification process in Congress. 
Rather conveniently, evolving jurisprudence on immunity 
for foreign heads of state and officials may provide a basis for 
formulating US domestic guidelines in this area. For example, 
under international law, sitting heads of state and senior officials 
enjoy full immunity before foreign national courts for conduct 
performed while in office.172 In the absence of guidance from the 
 
170. Id. at 777–78 (emphasis in original). 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 42–62 (discussing this common law analysis 
used in the head-of-state immunity context, including the independent determination 
made by courts in the absence of executive-branch guidance). 
172. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 
3, 21–22 (Feb. 14). 
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executive branch,173 US courts could draw upon the ICJ 
precedent in Congo v. Belgium, which generally allows full 
personal immunity from prosecution, or immunity ratione 
personae, to sitting heads of state and other high-ranking foreign 
officials under customary international law.174 Such reliance 
would conform to US executive branch practice because the 
branch has generally recommended immunity for sitting heads 
of state who are recognized as the official leaders of their 
country.175 In addition, this approach conforms to the spirit if not 
the letter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, which states that heads of state are 
accorded immunity from suit for actions performed during 
official visits to foreign countries.176 This reliance also seems 
appropriate because ICJ decisions, such as Congo v. Belgium, 
though only formally binding on the parties to a particular 
dispute, constitute respected sources of international law. As a 
 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47 (discussing US judicial reliance on 
executive branch guidance in the context of head-of-state immunity); supra text 
accompanying notes 49–56 (discussing US court cases involving instances when 
executive branch guidance was lacking); see also supra text accompanying note 59. 
174. See Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at 22, 25 (noting that this immunity applies in 
foreign national trials of sitting heads of state and other senior officials, meaning that it 
does not apply in international tribunals with jurisdiction or in the courts of the head of 
state’s home country). The Congo v. Belgium decision focused primarily on immunity 
from criminal prosecution for sitting heads of state and officials in the courts of foreign 
nations. For a case holding that these individuals also enjoy immunity from civil suits for 
damages in foreign national courts, see Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-
Arabiya AS Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), [2006] UKHL 26 (2006), [2007] 1 
A.C. 270 (appeal taken from Eng.). In addition to the Congo v. Belgium decision, US 
courts could rely upon the Charles Taylor Immunity Decision, discussed supra, Part 
II.A.2. 
175. See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 
169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139–40 
(E.D.N.Y, 1994). In contrast, when a head of state is not the recognized constitutional 
leader, has left office, or has had his immunity waived by his home state, the executive 
branch has generally declined to suggest immunity. See, e.g., Estate of Domingo v. 
Republic of the Phillippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (executive branch 
did not suggest immunity for former head of state Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210–11, (S.D. Fl. 1992) (executive branch 
did not suggest immunity in context of waiver); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506, 1518–19 (S.D. Fl. 1990) (executive branch did not suggest immunity for 
constitutionally unrecognized leader). Note that the Philippine government had also 
waived Marcos’s immunity. See In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1988). 
176. See infra note 178. Notably, the Restatement’s concept of immunity for heads 
of state is technically more limited in nature (e.g., immunity for actions performed while 
on official visits abroad). 
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corollary, the ICJ pronouncement in Congo v. Belgium that the 
norm implicating head-of-state immunity stems from customary 
international law means that the United States is generally 
obligated to follow that norm.177 Finally, providing full immunity 
to sitting heads of state, particularly those making official foreign 
visits, aligns nicely with long-standing policy goals such as 
promoting friendly relations, peace, and international security 
among states.178 
 While there is a strong argument to be made that under 
international law, US courts should refrain from prosecuting a 
foreign sitting head of state even in the absence of an executive 
branch suggestion of immunity, a US court contemplating such a 
prosecution should first consider a range of circumstances and 
factors prior to proceeding. For example, a court could consider 
whether the foreign state made any formal or informal gesture to 
waive their leader’s immunity.179 Such a waiver would serve as 
strong evidence that the foreign state had no objection—or 
 
177. The binding nature of ICJ judgments on the parties to a particular case is 
expressed in Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, arts. 38(1)(b), 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, (demonstrating that 
customary international law is binding on nations by defining international customary 
law as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law” and expressing the binding 
nature of ICJ judgments on the parties to a particular case); see also Steven Koh, 
Respectful Consideration after Sanchez-Llamas: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the 
International Court of Justice, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 265–73 (2007) (arguing that US 
courts, particularly the US Supreme Court, should give more weight to ICJ decisions: 
“As legal systems continue to integrate in a globalizing world, US courts will increasingly 
face divergent domestic and international obligations. Though the International Court 
of Justice does not assert any formal authority over the US Supreme Court, its mounting 
influence over a variety of international legal matters should cause the Court to heavily 
weigh the ICJ's decisions.”); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 193 (“In essence, 
international custom . . . is comprised of rules that states implicitly accept as legally 
binding through their conduct.”). 
178. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ¶¶ 2, 4, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 (mentioning these policy goals in the context of visiting foreign consuls); 
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 464 (“When a head of state or government comes 
on an official visit to another country, he is generally given the same personal 
inviolability and immunities as are accorded to members of special missions, essentially 
those of an accredited diplomat.”) Under the VCDR, diplomatic agents are immune 
from the jurisdiction of any receiving state. This immunity extends to criminal, civil, and 
administrative jurisdiction. VCDR, supra note 89, art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95. These standards for diplomatic relations were created to recognize the 
status of diplomatic agents and reinforce international equality, peace, and security. Id. 
pmbl. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63 (discussing the waiver issue in the 
head-of-state context). 
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consented—to US courts exercising jurisdiction over its leader. 
In addition, a court may evaluate whether the US government 
recognized the putative head of state as the official leader of the 
country.180 A denial of such recognition would suggest that the 
US executive branch does not seek immunity in the particular 
case and perhaps more importantly, that the “leader” is not 
entitled to immunity as a legitimate head of state. Another factor 
that courts may consider is the nature of the acts committed by 
the head of state. For example, purely private, commercial acts 
could be viewed as not triggering immunity while official acts 
would be entitled to immunity.181 Thus, when a head of state 
commits an illegal act as part of a personal business venture (e.g., 
 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59 (discussing the factor of formal 
recognition of a foreign leader by the US government). 
181. The private versus public nature of acts is an analytical criterion that is also 
used in the former-head-of-state context. See, e.g., supra notes 63–66 and accompanying 
text (US law); supra notes 91, 144, and accompanying text (international law). Note that 
the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium rejected any exception to immunity under customary 
international law for sitting heads of state and senior officials for certain, potentially 
“private” activity committed while in office, namely war crimes or crimes against 
humanity (e.g., international crimes). See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). Thus, US courts contemplating using the 
public-private distinction to evaluate immunity for a sitting head of state must give “due 
regard” to this pronouncement regarding customary law by the ICJ; however, using or 
applying this distinction is not necessarily in violation of customary law. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97–98 
(June 27) (“If a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the 
rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.”); see also 
Mallory, Resolving the Confusion, supra note 3, at 190–93 (arguing that, similar to the FSIA 
exceptions in the context of foreign sovereign immunity, in the context of head-of-state 
immunity there should be immunity exceptions in cases of waiver, commercial activity, 
certain kinds of property (e.g., expropriated property gifts, inheritances and moveable 
property), and for certain non-commercial torts that cause injury or death in the United 
States). For the actual text pertaining to these FSIA provisions, see supra notes 34–42 
and accompanying text. Mallory also argues that the person of a head of state should be 
inviolable; therefore, like diplomats, heads of state should not be subject to arrest or 
detention when on official, foreign visits. Because Mallory argues for freeing heads of 
state completely from the criminal jurisdiction of the United States and for the 
inviolability of the head of state’s person (i.e., from arrest or detention), his argument 
for maintaining head-of-state liability in criminal cases requires that civil tort liability be 
“appended to criminal acts.” Id. at 193–96. Successful plaintiffs in such a tort suit would 
be awarded monetary damages (e.g., as opposed to a jail sentence for the defendant). Id. 
at 195–96. 
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drug trafficking), immunity would not apply.182 “Ordinary” type 
crimes such as murder or theft not connected with official, state-
sanctioned policies (e.g., legitimate military action, a duly 
authorized court sentence, etc.) could also be considered 
“private” acts. Conversely, decisions related to the 
implementation of state policy by the head of state, such as those 
touching upon the economy, health care, the environment, or 
foreign relations would be immune from the jurisdiction of US 
courts.183 
In addition, if the foreign head of state has committed a 
grave crime in violation of international law norms, US courts 
should consider deferring to any ongoing or pending 
investigation by an international prosecuting body that has 
jurisdiction. For example, the ICC was created for the express 
purpose of prosecuting serious international crimes such as 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and can 
exercise its jurisdiction to try such crimes in a variety of instances, 
including exercising jurisdiction over sitting heads of state.184 
 
182. For example, the Court in Noriega viewed drug trafficking for personal 
monetary gain to be an unofficial, private act. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 
1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997). 
183. For a detailed discussion of how crimes “fit” into the public versus private 
dichotomy, see infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text, addressing the former head-
of-state issue. 
184. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ acknowledged that even sitting heads of state (and 
other senior officials) can be tried by international tribunals such as the ICC. See Congo 
v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at 25. For the idea that the ICC is focused on grave international 
crimes, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For a list of the qualifying crimes over which 
the ICC has substantive jurisdiction, see id. art. 5, ¶ 1. These crimes (e.g., genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes) are defined more specifically in Articles 6 to 8 
of the Rome Statute. For the situations in which the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction 
over qualifying crimes, see id. art. 12 (explaining that the court may exercise its 
jurisdiction over crimes occurring on the territory of state parties to the Rome Statute or 
if the person accused of a crime is a national of one of the state parties) and art. 13 
(explaining that situations, or cases, may be referred to the ICC by a state party, by the 
UN Security Council—in which case the Article 12 requirements are inapplicable—or as 
a result of the prosecutor’s own investigations). The ICC can prosecute sitting (or 
former) heads of state and other governmental officials. See id. art. 27, ¶ 1 (“Th[e 
Rome] Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”); see also supra note 117 
(discussing the ICC’s indictment of President Al-Bashir of Sudan). The statutes of other 
international criminal tribunals, including the ICTR, ICTY, and the Special Court for 
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Though US courts formally have jurisdiction over certain grave 
international crimes such as genocide and war crimes, and 
although the United States is not yet a state party to the ICC,185 
strong conceptual and policy-oriented reasons point in the 
direction of deference to an international body that has 
jurisdiction, such as the ICC. For example, subjecting a current 
foreign leader to US criminal jurisdiction represents a significant 
 
Sierra Leone, all contain similar provisions to the ICC provision prohibiting immunity 
for heads of state and other officials. See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, supra note 105, at art. 6, para. 2 (“The official position of accused as head of 
state or government official does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate 
punishment.”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1598 (“The official position of accused as head of state or government official 
does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate punishment.”); Statute for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, para. 2, May 25, 1993, 
32 I.L.M. 1159 (“The official position of accused as head of state or government official 
does not relieve accused of responsibility or mitigate punishment.”). Former President 
of Liberia Charles Taylor was denied any immunity for his crimes, including crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, before the Special Court of Sierra Leone despite 
having committed them while in office. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-
I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004). The former Prime Minister 
of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was tried and convicted before the ICTR for genocide and 
crimes against humanity, see Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-DP, 
Indictment, at 6–7 (Oct. 16, 1997), and received a life sentence. See ICTR 97-23-S, 
Judgment and Sentence, 28 (Sept. 4, 1998). Finally, the President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”), Slobodan Milošević, was indicted before the ICTY for 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment (June 29, 2001). Milošević died before his 
trial could be completed before the ICTY. See Key Figures, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/
sections/TheCases/KeyFigures#concpros (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
185. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009) (criminalizing, under US law, the 
international crime of genocide); id. § 2441 (2006) (criminalizing war crimes under US 
law). For a further discussion of these domestic statutes, see CARTER ET AL., supra note 
28, at 1160–79. There are treaty obligations on the part of the US to punish certain 
international crimes. For example, the United States, a state party to the Genocide 
Convention, must punish criminal acts of genocide either in its domestic courts—
provided the acts were committed on US territory—or “by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those [states] which shall have accepted 
its jurisdiction.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, arts. 5–6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Thus, in the case of genocide, these 
international obligations would be satisfied by deferring to a prosecution of a head of 
state by an international tribunal. In the case of deference to the ICC, the United States, 
not a formal member of the court, could make an ad hoc agreement with the court to 
accept its jurisdiction in the particular case. See Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 87, ¶¶ 
5(a)–(b). Of course, if the international forum made no effort to proceed against the 
foreign leader, there would be no forum to which US courts might defer. For a 
discussion of legislation that the US Congress passed to implement obligations under 
the Genocide Convention, including a discussion of the Genocide Accountability Act of 
2007, see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 979. 
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affront to the sovereignty of the foreign nation, likely greater 
than any affront posed by an international court.186 Perhaps most 
importantly, the trial of a sitting head of state in the United 
States is likely to have substantial and primarily negative foreign 
policy implications for the United States. In most instances, the 
state whose current leader is being prosecuted will not view 
favorably such a maneuver by US courts. In addition, trying 
foreign leaders in US courts may have a chilling effect on the 
frequency of visits by foreign leaders to US soil or on productive 
interaction in general between these foreign leaders and their 
US counterparts. Furthermore, US courts aggressively exercising 
their jurisdiction over heads of state for international crimes may 
attract retaliatory actions by foreign states in the form of 
potentially frivolous lawsuits against US leaders in foreign courts. 
Finally, international trials of heads of state, though certainly not 
free of stability concerns,187 would seem to pose a lesser threat to 
international peace than “third party” national prosecutions. 
Moreover, deference by US courts in the head-of-state 
context to an on-going or pending international prosecution or 
to certain, legitimate foreign national prosecutions aligns nicely 
with the principle of complementarity inherent within the ICC 
system and with the principle of subsidiarity present in an 
increasing number of national jurisdictions.188 For example, 
 
186. The international forum draws its authority from the consensus and consent 
of multiple nations; indeed, in the case of the ICC, 113 countries are already parties to 
it. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/
states+parties (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
187. The warrant issued by the ICC for President Al-Bashir of the Sudan has 
attracted criticism, in part for its ability to further destabilize an already dire and 
precarious human rights situation in Sudan. For a description of the warrant issued by 
the ICC for Al-Bashir, see supra note 117. For a description of the human rights situation 
in Sudan, see Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an Integrated Approach 
to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur—The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement and Related 
Issues in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069 (2008). 
For criticism of the consequences of the ICC executing this warrant and proceeding with 
the prosecution of Al-Bashir, see Roza Pati, The ICC and the Case of Sudan’s Omar Al 
Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a Valid Option?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265, 324 
(2009) (“[T]he concern that Sudan, the largest nation in the African Continent, might 
risk partition, augmented by the fear of the collapse of a fragile peace process, creates a 
situation where a potential plea-bargain should be an option under consideration 
[instead of a full trial against al-Bashir].”). 
188. For example, both Germany and Spain have applied the principle of 
subsidiarity in their criminal prosecutions of foreign officials. See HENKIN ET AL., supra 
note 155, at 777 (explaining that because US authorities were investigating the matter, 
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under the concept of subsidiarity, US courts would defer to the 
courts of the territorial state in which the crime occurred (or the 
state of which the victim or suspect is a citizen) provided that 
those courts are both able and willing to carry out a fair, 
impartial trial of the head of state. Alignment with this emerging 
concept of subsidiarity will help to foster greater esteem for the 
United States in its foreign relations as this approach respects the 
sovereignty of foreign states. It also helps ensure that the United 
States will receive similar treatment when suits are contemplated 
abroad against its leaders (e.g., foreign nations will likewise be 
more inclined to defer to an on-going or impending US trial of 
the head of state, assuming the alleged crime occurred in the 
United States, the victim or the suspect is a US citizen, or there is 
a similarly strong US link to the crime in question). 
Notably, a call for deference by US courts to an on-going or 
pending international criminal prosecution of a foreign head of 
state fits within the spirit of the ICC’s complementarity principle, 
if not the letter.189 Such a call may perhaps best be termed 
 
the German prosecutor applied the principle of subsidiarity in an action brought by 
Iraqi nationals against US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield and others for alleged 
abusive treatment they suffered at the hands of US military personnel at Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq). Notably, for the German subsidiarity principle to apply, an investigation 
by the ICC or a “genuine” investigation by competent authorities of the territorial state 
of the crime (or of the state of nationality of the victim or suspect) is all that is required. 
See id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 168). The German universal criminal 
jurisdiction statute allows for prosecution of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity. See id.; see also Strafgesezbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, TEIL I at 3322 § 6 (Ger.). Similarly, Spain has placed certain 
limitations on its own exercise of universal jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad by 
foreigners: 
[T]he [Spanish] Constitutional Tribunal has held that Spanish courts must 
give priority to prosecutions in the territorial state if proceedings there have 
already been or will soon be initiated. But they need not defer to such 
proceedings when “serious and reasonable proofs of judicial inactivity 
[demonstrate] a fault, whether of will or of capacity, to effectively prosecute 
the crimes.” 
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (citing Jouet, supra note 164, at 511–13). In 
addition, Spanish jurisprudence indicates that Spain will also defer to international 
criminal prosecutions. Id. Finally, Spain does not permit trials under its universal 
jurisdiction statute against sitting heads of state or senior foreign officials (though trials 
against former heads and former officials as well as low-level officials is permitted), and 
in absentia trials are prohibited. Id. 
189. The complementarity principle of the ICC appears in Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. In the head-of-state context, the United States or another national jurisdiction 
would defer to an impending or on-going ICC prosecution under the complementarity 
concept if it was unwilling to proceed with the prosecution of the head of state. See 
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“selective” or “premeditated” reverse complementarity in the 
sense that the national jurisdiction (i.e., the United States) would 
actively choose to defer to a proceeding by the ICC in the 
context of a putative head of state by intentionally delaying or 
withholding domestic prosecution. This concept of 
“complementarity” in the context of a trial of a foreign head of 
state best supports policy goals related to the promotion of 
friendly foreign relations among nations (i.e., comity) as well as 
international peace and stability because such a trial represents 
less of an affront to the sovereignty of the nation of the head of 
state (as compared to a trial by a foreign national jurisdiction). In 
addition, in the context of grave international crimes committed 
by individuals such as heads of state, international tribunals like 
the ICC would appear to have greater expertise and experience 
with this particular type of crime. 
In their attempts to formulate a doctrine for former heads 
of state, US courts can draw upon both domestic and 
international law to fill existing gaps, in particular when the US 
executive branch declines to offer a suggestion of immunity.190 
Under relevant US and international jurisprudence former heads 
of state may not be prosecuted by a domestic or national court 
for official acts performed while in office, but these individuals 
may be prosecuted for private or commercial acts performed 
during this time.191 US and other national courts have indicated 
that activities like drug trafficking192 and torture193 do not 
 
Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 17 (1)(a). Delay in prosecution is one indicator of a 
state’s unwillingness to prosecute. Id. art. 17 (2)(b). A state may be unwilling to 
prosecute for a variety of reasons related to foreign relations, security, and stability. 
190. For a discussion of the role of executive branch guidance in determinations of 
immunity for former heads of state, see supra Part I.A. 
191. See, e.g., supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text (discussing US approach to 
immunity for former heads of state); see also supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text 
(discussing international law approach to immunity in national trials for former heads of 
state). Arguably, according to the dicta in the ICJ decision of Congo v. Belgium, former 
heads of state and officials no longer enjoy any immunity under international law for 
suits filed after they leave office (regardless of whether the act committed in office was 
“private” or “public”). See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). But since the part of the ICJ decision addressing 
former-head-of-state immunity in national prosecutions was dicta, and since ICJ 
decisions are technically binding only on the parties to the litigation, this aspect of the 
decision awaits further development at the international level. For further explanation 
of the binding nature of ICJ decisions, see supra note 177. 
192. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
drug trafficking for personal gain is a private activity conducted by a head of state). 
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constitute official acts (i.e., they are “private”). Therefore, 
torture and other international crimes of an intensely grave 
nature, such as genocide and war crimes, could also be 
considered “private.” In addition, US courts may also consider 
placing domestic acts that constitute crimes of a less grievous 
nature in the category of private acts. For example, “ordinary” 
felonies that do not rise to the level of an international crime, 
such as murder or rape, may arguably fall in the category of 
private acts. Finally, certain white-collar crimes committed for 
personal gain may qualify as private (e.g., bribery, embezzlement, 
fraud, and similar crimes constituting felonies under local 
law).194 Accordingly, absent an explicit suggestion of immunity by 
the executive branch, a former head of state should not be 
afforded immunity in US domestic courts for these types of acts, 
and could face prosecution for them despite the fact that they 
occurred while in office. 
In addition, absent executive branch guidance, US courts 
contemplating whether to try a former head of state may also 
consider whether the head of state’s “home” country has waived 
immunity for its former leader.195 Even absent such a waiver, 
trials of former heads of state by US courts would tend to 
generate less resentment by the “home” state, due to both the 
passage of time and the lesser degree to which the former leader 
would be viewed as intrinsically linked to his or her home 
country. Such a waiver of immunity by the “home” state, though 
not a strict requirement for a US trial of a former head of state, 
would nonetheless constitute clear and compelling evidence that 
 
193. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) 
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that former 
heads of state may be tried in non-domestic national courts—for acts of torture as a 
result of universal jurisdiction over these acts bestowed by the Torture Convention); see 
also supra notes 118–162. 
194. Immunity should still attach, however, for misdemeanor crimes because a 
prosecution by a foreign court for such a crime would not generally be worth any costs 
associated with such a prosecution (e.g., negative foreign policy repercussions, threats to 
peace and stability, retaliatory prosecutions, etc.). In addition, immunity should still 
attach for certain “justifiable” felonies such as a killing committed as part of legitimate, 
state-sanctioned warfare or as part of a lawfully mandated judicial sentence. In these 
particular cases, the act attributed to the former head of state should remain “official.” 
195. See Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209–11 (S.D. Fl. 1993); see also supra text 
accompanying note 63 (discussing waiver in the context of former heads of state); supra 
notes 59–62 and accompanying text (discussing waiver in the context of sitting heads of 
state). 
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the nation does not consider the trial a challenge to its own 
sovereignty or national interest. 
Notably, under the developing concept of subsidiarity 
already used by various states, US courts should consider 
deferring to an ongoing impartial trial or investigation of the 
former head of state in the country where the crime originally 
occurred, or in a state to which there is a similarly “strong” link 
to the crime.196 Such deference respects the sovereignty of the 
foreign nation while also ensuring the maintenance and 
promotion of peaceful relations between the foreign nation and 
the United States. Such an approach also ensures similar 
treatment to former US heads of state travelling abroad (e.g., 
deference by a foreign national court to an ongoing or 
impending trial or investigation in the United States of the 
former head of state, in those cases where the crime originally 
occurred in the United States or there is a similarly “strong” link 
between the crime and US interests). 
Furthermore, US courts should also consider deferring to an 
ongoing or pending trial or investigation of a former foreign 
head of state conducted by an international forum, such as the 
ICC, that has jurisdiction over serious crimes. International 
criminal tribunals, such as the ICC have particular expertise and 
experience in trying grave international crimes; in fact, it is often 
their sole mission or purpose.197 The nation of the former head 
of state will also likely view a trial by an international forum with 
less disdain or contempt than a similar trial by another, 
potentially rival, foreign nation; thus, a trial in this forum may 
represent less of a threat to international stability. In addition, 
international tribunals typically derive their authority from 
multiple nations or the international community as a whole, thus 
representing less of a threat to the sovereignty of the nation 
whose former head of state is being tried or investigated. 
Moreover, a US court’s deferral to an ongoing or pending 
 
196. For example, deferral should occur if an impartial trial or investigation is 
underway or soon to be underway by the state whose citizen is accused of or was 
victimized by the crime. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (providing examples 
of the existence or application of the subsidiarity principle by Germany and Spain). 
197. See e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 184. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, a 
hybrid domestic/international court, also has as its chief purpose the trial of 
international crimes. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 105, 
art. 1, ¶ 1. 
  
2011] HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY AFTER SAMANTAR 379 
criminal case by an international tribunal case aligns nicely with 
the actual practice of other states.198 Finally, such deferral falls 
within the scope of the complementarity concept inherent within 
the framework of the ICC, the most prominent international 
criminal tribunal.199 
Perhaps most significant, however, is that, in the context of 
foreign official immunity, Samantar has left both the content and 
scope of the foreign official immunity doctrine uncertain. Prior 
to Samantar, US courts generally looked to the FSIA for 
guidance; accordingly, if no exception under the FSIA applied 
(e.g., waiver, commercial activity), foreign officials were 
ordinarily conferred immunity for official acts performed during 
their tenure in office.200 Samantar’s holding that the FSIA no 
longer applies in the official-immunity analysis essentially means 
that traditional common-law analysis now will be the focus of 
inquiry in most foreign official immunity cases. As a result, 
similar to the common-law immunity inquiry for heads of state, 
executive branch guidance will begin to have a more prominent 
role in official immunity cases. This, in turn, places an increased 
burden on the executive branch to provide guidance in the 
naturally larger number of official immunity cases (compared to 
the relative dearth of cases in the context of head-of-state 
immunity). As a related matter, this larger reliance on executive 
branch guidance increases the risk of inconsistency and 
incoherence in official immunity analysis by replacing reasoned, 
precedent-based judicial analysis with more ad-hoc and 
potentially politically-influenced executive branch decision 
making. 
As a result, courts in the wake of Samantar should use 
executive branch guidance, when provided, as one factor in an 
overall “totality of the circumstances” inquiry into the foreign 
official immunity issue. When executive branch guidance is 
provided, it should, of course, be given enhanced weight by the 
courts as the valued opinion of a coordinate branch of the US 
government with a particular expertise and authority in foreign 
 
198. For a description of a similar practice of deferral by Spanish and German 
courts to international tribunals, see supra text accompanying notes 164–166, 168–170. 
199. For a detailed explanation of this “fit,” termed “selective” or “premeditated” 
reverse complementarity, see supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra note 70 (discussing pre-Samantar cases applying FSIA in foreign 
official immunity context). 
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relations, and courts should generally follow such guidance 
absent a strong reason to the contrary. But certain policy and 
other considerations that are present in the context of head-of-
state immunity are present to a lesser degree in the context of 
foreign-official immunity, and these considerations favor a more 
flexible, totality-of-circumstances approach to official immunity 
analysis (e.g., as a result of these considerations, executive 
branch guidance should be one important factor in the foreign 
official immunity inquiry, but this guidance should not be 
determinative on the immunity question, as it is in the head-of-
state context). For example, while the decision to try a head of 
state can have significant foreign policy implications, such an 
impact is lesser in the case of a governmental official, particularly 
a low-level official. In the course of conducting a full inquiry into 
the immunity question for one of these governmental officials, 
courts are less likely to interfere in the foreign relations dealings 
of the executive, or somehow harm these relations. 
Accordingly, US courts examining the immunity of a low-
level foreign governmental official should examine not only 
executive branch guidance, when it exists, but also the nature of 
the conduct engaged in by the official, any waiver by the foreign 
government, and whether the official engaged in a private or 
official act. For example, even before Samantar, US courts 
examining the official immunity issue generally refrained from 
bestowing immunity for private acts committed by the official 
while in office.201 In addition, if the act for which immunity was 
sought constituted a domestic or international crime, immunity 
was generally denied.202 This previous judicial inquiry into the 
nature of the act should continue even after Samantar.203 In 
addition, even though FSIA does not strictly apply after Samantar, 
US courts could still look toward its provisions, particularly the 
various exceptions to immunity, as suggested guidelines on the 
official immunity question. Precedent cases from the pre-
Samantar era that examined, for example, the waiver, commercial 
 
201. See supra note 70. 
202. See Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also supra note 
70. If the alleged crime was committed as part of state-sanctioned warfare, courts in the 
pre-Samantar era were likely to maintain the immunity of the foreign official. See id. 
203. For example, when a foreign official commits a crime that is not connected to 
his official state duties or commits a crime as part of a private business venture, 
immunity would generally not apply. 
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activity, or terrorism exceptions to immunity under FSIA, though 
no longer formally applicable in the foreign official immunity 
inquiry, may still serve as useful guideposts in the largely 
undeveloped common law analysis for this area.204 
In addition, special immunity considerations may apply in 
the case of a sitting high, or senior, governmental official. A 
failure to provide immunity in these cases may have serious, 
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. Thus, 
even if the underlying conduct by the high official was private in 
nature or constituted a crime, US courts should almost certainly 
defer to the executive branch in this instance.205 In addition, 
apart from deference to the executive branch, trials by national 
courts of sitting foreign government officials in senior positions 
are generally prohibited by international law as well as the law of 
several national jurisdictions.206 Only if the executive branch fails 
to provide guidance, or the guidance offered was in direct 
contravention of these international law norms, should US courts 
undertake a more flexible, totality of circumstances analysis. 
 
204. For a list and description of these pre-Samantar cases applying FSIA in the 
foreign official immunity context, see supra note 70. 
205. The US Constitution places foreign relations authority in the executive 
branch; hence, generally speaking, the executive branch has not only more power in this 
area but also more expertise and experience. See U.S. CONST. art. II; see also CARTER ET 
AL., supra note 28, at 191 (“[T]he President has always exercised substantial foreign 
relations power. Indeed, the President is often described as having the dominant role in 
the conduct of US foreign relations.”). Senior government officials include heads or 
deputy heads (e.g., “vice” heads) of government departments or ministries, officers with 
command authority in the state military, officials directly below the head of state and 
within the “chain of command” in the event of the head of state’s death or 
incapacitation, etc. 
206. For relevant international law on this topic, see supra notes 85–92. For 
relevant Spanish law on this issue, see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777. A sitting 
senior foreign governmental official can only be tried by a foreign national court under 
international law once leaving office (and then only for acts committed prior to 
obtaining or after leaving office, or for “private” acts committed while in office), or in 
cases where the official’s home country waives immunity or undertakes the trial itself. See 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 58–61. 
In the case of a contemplated US trial of a former foreign governmental official, not 
only do different international standards exist but also different policy considerations 
appear to apply. Former officials, even senior ones, may be tried under international law 
standards in foreign national courts for “private” acts committed in office (as well as for 
acts performed before entering or after leaving office). See id. Also, US trials of former 
officials are less likely to impact United States foreign relations than trials of sitting 
officials. 
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Finally, similar to the head-of-state context, US courts 
should seriously consider deferring to an ongoing or pending 
international criminal trial of a foreign official, particularly a 
senior one, as well as deferring to a legitimate trial of such an 
official by the foreign national jurisdiction in which the alleged 
crime occurred (or of which the accused or victim is a citizen). 
Many of the theoretical and policy reasons discussed above in the 
context of heads of state and deference by US courts to 
international and certain foreign domestic proceedings (e.g., 
sovereignty and foreign policy concerns, reciprocity 
considerations, the principles of subsidiarity and 
complementarity) apply with equal force in the context of 
foreign officials, particularly high-ranking ones. In the case of 
low-level foreign officials, a deference analysis will largely be 
absent because international tribunals have primarily been 
created for the purpose of trying more prominent participants in 
mass atrocities and will be less, if at all, interested in pursuing 
low-level criminals.207 Likewise, in terms of limiting provisions on 
the application of universal criminal jurisdiction by foreign states 
and their courts, these states appear not to include such a 
provision in the context of prosecution of low level officials.208 
Moreover, foreign nations are less likely to construe a US trial of 
a low level official as an affront to their sovereignty, and 
therefore foreign policy and stability concerns in this context are 
diminished. 
CONCLUSION 
Head-of-state and official immunity jurisprudence in the 
United States is in a state of flux and confusion, particularly after 
the US Supreme Court decision in Samantar. Regarding heads of 
state, US courts need more precise guidelines to evaluate 
immunity decisions, particularly in the absence of executive 
branch guidance. Developing international norms in the area of 
head-of-state immunity, in combination with the limited 
precedential US cases in this area, can help to provide content 
for these guidelines. In addition, the vacuum created by Samantar 
may be filled, in part, by drawing upon the existing head-of-state 
 
207. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 184, art. 1, ¶ 1. 
208. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 777 (explaining Spain’s limiting 
principle in this area on the exercise of its universal criminal jurisdiction). 
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immunity precedent, FSIA-era cases in the official immunity 
context, and international law jurisprudence and codification in 
this area. Nonetheless, Samantar may signal an increased number 
of lawsuits against foreign officials in light of its removal of 
judicial application of immunity under the FSIA. Finally, in the 
context of both head-of-state and foreign-official immunity, 
developing notions of subsidiarity and complementarity in the 
foreign domestic and international arenas provide strong policy 
reasons for US courts to incorporate these notions into US 
jurisprudence. 
